Legislative Responsiveness to Constituency Change

Abstract

Across democracies, elected officials are expected to represent their constituents, but how do legislators react to changes in their constituency? This core question of legislative responsiveness is examined in the context of the bicameral U.S. Congress where more than 100 legislators have served in both chambers since 1960. These chamber-changers provide a unique vantage point for examining constituency representation, including competing expectations based on the electoral connection and the ideological stability of legislative voting. Based on analyses of original data, I find overwhelming evidence of legislative responsiveness to both constituency change and constituency stability. Moreover, when legislators' constituencies change, they respond by changing their behavior in ways that reflect both the direction and magnitude of constituency change.

How Committees Shape Legislative Behavior: An Examination of Interests and Institutions

“…By contrast, the reasons that led them to request the committee are immediate and present. This type of behavior is consistent with recent work showing that Members of Congress are responsive to opposing campaigns or changes in district composition (e.g., Crespin, 2010;Miler, 2016;Sulkin, 2011). Notably, recent work by Grimmer and Powell (2013) finds that Members of Congress adapt their electoral behavior in reaction to losing their committee seat later in their career.…”

“…By leveraging the committee assignment process, I offer new evidence of legislators as responsive political actors who adapt their behavior in Congress (e.g., Grimmer & Powell, 2013;Miler, 2016;Sulkin, 2005). This research also contributes to the ongoing debate over committees as outliers who drive the legislative agenda in ways unrepresentative of the full chamber.…”

Incentives dominate selection – Chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences

“…An especially promising strand of literature tries to discern incentives and selection by investigating the behavior of legislators who changed from one set of incentives to another set by changing from one chamber of parliament with given electoral rules to another (e.g. Poole and Daniels 1985;Grofman et al 1995;Miler 2016). However, changing the chamber usually goes along with changes in the geographical constituency.…”

“…Miler (2016) argues that legislators in other countries may gradually change their behavior in light of upcoming candidacies for other mandates.…”

Income Inequality and State Parties: Who Gets Represented?

“…Until recently, empirical studies of representation in the United States have told a rather positive story about the responsiveness of elected officials (and of the policy process generally) to the broad preferences of the public. Following in the tradition of Miller and Stokes’ (1963) classic “Constituency in Congress,” and after some methodological corrections (Achen 1977, 1978; Erikson 1978, 1981), a good deal of research concluded that despite the public’s lack of interest, information, and real attitudes, there exists considerable correspondence between districts’ ideological orientations and the roll call voting of members of Congress (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone 2015; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson and Wright 1980, 2000, 2009; Hall 2015; Hollibaugh, Rothenberg, and Rulison 2013; Miler 2016; Sulkin, Testa, and Usry 2015; Wright and Berkman 1986) and even state legislatures (Birkhead 2015; Hogan 2004, 2008). Beyond legislative voting, studies of state policy (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and national policy making over time (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) add up to a large body of work which indicates that indeed, even without attentive, well-informed citizens, elected officials are reasonably responsive to public preferences.…”