Legislative budget cycles

Shelton, Cameron A.

doi:10.1007/s11127-012-0043-9

Cited by 17 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Along the same lines, Chang (2008), focusing on OECD countries, shows that incumbents increase social welfare spending before elections under proportional representation, while they raise district-specific spending (including 6 Furthermore, in proportional systems, incentives for good individual performance by a politician may be diluted because citizens vote on a list and, consequently, elections are a less powerful tool to discipline policymakers. Working with a panel of countries, Shelton (2014) confirms Persson and Tabelini's prediction that electoral budget cycles are stronger under majoritarian rules. He also claims, and finds evidence, that a strong party system mitigates the electoral budget cycles more in countries with majoritarian electoral systems than in those with proportional rules.…”

Section: Factors Affecting the Readiness And Incentives Of Politiciansupporting

confidence: 68%

Political budget cycles and media freedom

Veiga

Morozumi

2017

Electoral Studies

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Abstract:This paper examines the effects of elections on the conduct of central governments' fiscal policies. To do so, it uses a unique panel database that includes disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level for multiple countries over the 1975-2010 period. Examining political environments under which incumbent governments generate political budget cycles (PBCs), and comparing the relative importance of factors influencing cycles, we identify media freedom as the factor that plays the most critical role. This result provides a micro-foundation for rational opportunistic models for PBCs that rely on asymmetry of information about politicians' competence, and also offers a way to relate different conditioning factors of PBCs, including fiscal transparency and the maturity of democracies. Further, we show that the election-year rise in budget deficits under low media freedom is primarily driven by an increase in the current, not capital, component of public expenditure.

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Section: Factors Affecting the Readiness And Incentives Of Politiciansupporting

confidence: 68%

Political budget cycles and media freedom

Veiga

Morozumi

2017

Electoral Studies

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“…In a similar vein, more recent studies have focused on dierent types of checks and balances: legislative veto players and compliance with scal laws (Streb et al, 2009, 427), scal transparency and party polarization (Alt and Lassen, 2006), party institutionalization (Shelton, 2014), and the checks and balances produced by presidential systems (Persson and Tabellini, 2003b). Some of the studies link the argument to democratization (e.g., Shelton, 2014). However, most suggest that in the absence of checks and balances, PBCs occur even in advanced democracies (Streb et al, 2009;Alt and Lassen, 2006).…”

Section: Democratization and Pbcsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second shortcoming is that the literature is based on one-dimensional conceptualizations of democratization, measured either dichotomously (Shi and Svensson, 2006;Shelton, 2014;Drazen, 2005, 2007;Streb et al, 2009) or by the number of competitive elections held in a country Drazen, 2005, 2007;Vergne, 2009). While one-dimensional conceptualizations and dichotomous measures 7 Vergne (2009)'s nding that the cycles disappear as countries gain more experience with elections only applies to PBCs in aggregate spending.…”

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confidence: 99%

Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles

Eibl

Lynge-Mangueira

2016

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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The literature on political budget cycles (PBCs) does not offer a full-fledged theory about the effect of democratization. However, it does imply a non-linear effect along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, negative at the democratic end. We theoretically develop and empirically test this implication by pointing to two countervailing effects of democratization:executive constraintsandpolitical competition. While the former contains PBCs, the latter stimulates them. Because of their empirical covariation, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes where the decision-making powers of the executive are relatively unrestricted and politics is relatively competitive. We also show that while executive constraints and political competition condition PBCs, what triggers the fluctuations iselectoral competitiveness. Only when incumbents fear electoral defeat, do they create PBCs. The study is based on novel data on public spending in 112 countries, covering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006.

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“…In Alpanda and Honig (2010), the government is constrained in generating a PBC by its borrowing capacity. Finally, endowment in natural resources can play a role (Vergne 2009).political alignment or affiliation (i.e., when local and national executives belong to the same party) as shown in Lema and Streb (2013) and Rumi (2014), the strength of political parties (Shelton 2014) and the strength of the incumbent government, a divided or fragmented government being less able to generate a PBC because of coordination costs ( …”

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confidence: 99%

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus

Dubois

2016

Public Choice

166

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Abstract:The aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following Nordhaus's (1975) publication on political business cycles (PBCs). I first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground-breaking contribution saw the light of the day. I also present a simplified version of Nordhaus's model to highlight his key results. I detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth. I then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on political business cycles, the actual research agenda. Finally, Iderive some paths for future research.

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Legislative budget cycles

Cited by 17 publications

References 29 publications

Political budget cycles and media freedom

Political budget cycles and media freedom

Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus

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