Legislative Activity in the Canadian House of Commons: Does Majority or Minority Government Matter?

Conley, Richard S.

doi:10.1080/02722011.2011.623237

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Strøm has argued that the formation of a government without a secure majority in parliament might be a rational choice for political parties, and found that minority governments work effectively in various countries such as Norway, where most governments have no majority in parliament. This has also been supported by other scholars, such as Mayhew (2005) in relation to the United States and Conley (2011) in relation to Canada. Crombez has suggested that 'minority governments are signs of the largest party's strength' and not of its weakness, given that the government parties in question control the median legislator (1996,1).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW

Matthieß¹

2018

German Politics

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This study examines how a government's majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties' electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister's party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW

Matthieß¹

2018

German Politics

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“…Second, a similar expectations‐based argument applies to politically weak governments. In particular, voters may not expect much productivity from a minority government (Conley & Bekafigo ; Conley ) . Thus, parties in a minority government may be given more credit than parties in a majority government for attempting to complete and/or actually completing a social pact agreement; and may be blamed less for failure to convert a social pact proposal into a social pact agreement.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although Conley and Bekafigo () and Conley () find that minority governments produce less legislation than majority governments, Vowles () finds that minority status does not significantly influence voters’ perception of governing parties’ ability to ‘make a difference’.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

Castater

Han

2017

European J Political Res

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Abstract. The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally.

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“…Two-party dominant Westminster systems such as Australia’s, for example, would not typically return minority governments, which are the norm for multiparty systems such as Denmark’s and Norway’s. It can happen, however (Russell 2008), as it has occasionally in the UK (Paun 2011) and does with regularity in Canada, where there is no tradition of coalition formation (Conley 2011). However, the Greens have not yet supported a national government in either of these countries.…”

Section: Political Trajectory Minority Government and Policy Impactmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stepping Stone, Halfway House or Road to Nowhere? Green Support of Minority Government in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia

Crowley

Moore

2019

Gov. & oppos.

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Whilst much has been written about the opportunities and perils of Green participation in national coalition governments, analysis of Greens supporting minority governments is less common and has not focused on comparative-historical trends as this article does. We look beyond single case studies of Green-supported minority governments in order to establish historical party trajectories and policy impact over time in three countries with different political systems. The extent of the comparative work here has never previously been undertaken and establishes that repeat instances of such support can provide the basis for more stable and effective future interparty governing relationships. However, we argue that, whilst trust can build between parties to minority government arrangements over decades, it is not assured, and, whilst Green parties may achieve ministerial control after repeat instances of supporting minority governments, the benefits of doing so are not guaranteed.

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Legislative Activity in the Canadian House of Commons: Does Majority or Minority Government Matter?

Cited by 15 publications

References 19 publications

Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW

Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

Stepping Stone, Halfway House or Road to Nowhere? Green Support of Minority Government in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia

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