Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy

Solaiman, S M

doi:10.1007/s10506-016-9192-3

Cited by 123 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Another possible solution that has been proposed by the European Union is creating a new legal status only for robots [40] [41]. There is a tendency to humanize robots if robots have grown sophisticated enough to exhibit "human behavior."…”

Section: Possible Solutions To the Dilemma Of Liabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The possibility of creating a specific legal status for the most sophisticated robots (named electronic persons) and to apply electronic personality to cases where sophisticated robots make autonomous decision or interact with third parties [40]. Having a legal status of "electronic person" is seen as similar to the legal personality of a corporation, robots could be held liable for their behaviors and enter into legal agreements [41]. The creation of a separate status for robots would introduce a clear and separate entity in which the actions and behavior of robots are controlled and managed separately from the owner [43].…”

Section: Possible Solutions To the Dilemma Of Liabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Machines: Influences, Consequences, and Dilemmas in Human Care

Pepito¹,

Vasquez²,

Locsin³

2019

Health

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In the field of robotics and in the health sciences, transitions have been occurring in the control of robots operating with predetermined logic and rules. Robotics in health care are influencing human caring dynamics in many ways such as enhancing dependency and surrender to machine technologies. Situations such as these are charged with possibilities of legal liabilities triggered by influences and consequences of advancing robotic technology dependency. The purpose of this paper is to identify, describe, and explain legal issues and/or dilemmas centered on robotics in healthcare while providing engaging opportunities to limit consequent legalities thus forming beneficial human health care outcomes. Laying bare these liabilities will provide critically informative data that can foster proactive encounters which can or may deter health care liabilities while ensuring quality healthcare outcomes. An attempt is made to re-conceptualize how to view agency, causality, liability responsibility, culpability, and autonomy for the new age of autonomous robots. While it is still not clear how this would turn out, a clear framing of the problem is the first step in the project.

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Section: Possible Solutions To the Dilemma Of Liabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Possible Solutions To the Dilemma Of Liabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Machines: Influences, Consequences, and Dilemmas in Human Care

Pepito¹,

Vasquez²,

Locsin³

2019

Health

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The complexity of an AI system may necessitate a simplified model to remedy the damages caused by untraceable errors, or even sheer bad luck, to ensure that any legal proceeding does not become so unwieldy as to effectively preclude an injured party from recovering damages. Although some commentators have criticised the idea of personality for AI on the basis that they cannot assume rights and duties (Bryson et al 2017;Solaiman 2016), this seems to have begged the question of why they should not assume such rights and duties. Indeed, they can be considered a bundle or package of rights, duties and responsibilities like corporations (Vladeck 2014).…”

Section: Ai Versus Simentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 The quote continues: "To confer legal rights or to impose legal duties, therefore, is to confer legal personality." For recent reference to this quote, see, for example, Bryson et al (2017),Solaiman (2016). Another useful, and complimentary, definition of is provided by Radin (1932): "'person' or a 'personality,' it is declared, is not a human being nor anything given in nature, but a group of rights and capacities, or at any rate a group of legal relations, and this group owes its existence entirely to the recognition of it by the legal and institutional organization of the community.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous intelligence can problematise differences between humans, artificial intelligence, companies and animals

Chen

Burgess

2018

Artif Intell Law

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In this paper, we identify the way in which various forms of legal personhood can be differentiated from one another by comparing these entities with a-not too farfetched-hypothetical situation in which intelligence spontaneously evolves (i.e. without human design) within the internet: spontaneous intelligence ("SI"). In these terms, we consider the challenges that may arise where SI as an entity: has no owner, no designer, and no controller; has evolved into existence as a non-human created intelligence; is autonomous; has no physical form; and, although it exists around the world, exists in no particular jurisdiction. Based on this refined notion of SI, we consider issues related to the recognition of such an entity's legal personhood. By briefly exploring the attribution of legal personality to various entitiesincluding, humans, corporations, artificial intelligence ("AI") (in various forms) and higher forms of animal life-we differentiate SI from these other forms of intelligence whilst illustrating it shares most characteristics with human intelligence and not, as may intuitively be thought, with various forms of AI. After critically evaluating the classification of these various forms of intelligence, we briefly suggest some ramifications of these differences and suggest that the approach adopted may assist in drawing more effective boundaries between the entities that are already recognised as legal persons, as well as between sub-categories of entities, such as various forms of AI.

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“…Recent developments in robotics and machine learning are initiating a "new generation of systems that rival or exceed human capabilities" (Kaplan 2015, 3). Advances in technology of this kind, for example in the form of intelligent military robots (Hellström 2013;Sparrow 2007), industrial robots (Solaiman 2017), or self-driving cars (Nyholm and Smids 2016), have far-reaching moral, social, and legal consequences. They generate philosophical questions, such as whether robots can be held morally and legally responsible for their actions (Gunkel 2017;Matthias 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap)

Kraaijeveld

2019

Sci Eng Ethics

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Robotization is an increasingly pervasive feature of our lives. Robots with high degrees of autonomy may cause harm, yet in sufficiently complex systems neither the robots nor the human developers may be candidates for moral blame. John Danaher has recently argued that this may lead to a retribution gap, where the human desire for retribution faces a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame. The potential social and moral implications of a retribution gap are considerable. I argue that the retributive intuitions that feed into retribution gaps are best understood as deontological intuitions. I apply a debunking argument for deontological intuitions in order to show that retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retributive punishment in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for blame. The fundamental moral question thus becomes what we ought to do with these retributive intuitions, given that they do not justify retribution. I draw a parallel from recent work on implicit biases to make a case for taking moral responsibility for retributive intuitions. In the same way that we can exert some form of control over our unwanted implicit biases, we can and should do so for unjustified retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm.

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Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy

Cited by 123 publications

References 22 publications

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Machines: Influences, Consequences, and Dilemmas in Human Care

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Machines: Influences, Consequences, and Dilemmas in Human Care

The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous intelligence can problematise differences between humans, artificial intelligence, companies and animals

Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap)

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