Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement

Spamann, Holger

doi:10.1628/093245610790711591

Cited by 32 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Others question the exogenous nature of legal origins as colonial strategies differed across English common law and French civil traditions (Klerman et al, 2011;Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, 2011;Guerriero, forthcoming). Similarly, Spamann (2010) finds "no systematic difference in the complexity, formalism, duration, or cost of procedure in courts of first instance (149)." Guerriero (2011) argues legal origins are proxies for the weakness of democracy and cultural heterogeneity but agrees that institutional forms related to economic performance are slow changing and historically shaped.…”

Section: Empirical Strategy and Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do legal origins affect cross-country incarceration rates?

D’Amico

Williamson

2015

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Section: Empirical Strategy and Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do legal origins affect cross-country incarceration rates?

D’Amico

Williamson

2015

Journal of Comparative Economics

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“…First, with regard to the issue of agency, an examination of the rules of civil procedure by measuring the length, formalism and costs of trial court proceedings and attention to what incites judges to act in furtherance of the social welfare , 4 failed to reveal any systematic difference between the systems ( Spamann, 2010b ; see also in a comparable vein, Spamann, 2010a ).…”

Section: Literature On Law and Economic Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the law: Sécurité juridique as a watermark

Raynouard

Kerhuel²

2011

Int J Discl Gov

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The relationship between law and economic development remains enigmatic. Broadly speaking, there is no doubt that legal mechanisms for social control (or ' institutions ' , to use North ' s words) play a major role. Nevertheless, the impact of legal organization on economic development has not been clearly identifi ed. Despite the progress attained by major studies in recent years, they have not defi nitively resolved whether law is a condition precedent to economic development, or rather a supporting element thereof, much less whether a particular legal system is necessarily and universally optimal. The failure of collectivization is evident. However, the open market model has multiple variants of the state ' s role and the degrees of regulation. A fi rst approximation challenging the relevance of economic analysis of this topic notes the frequent confusion between legal system, legal rule, administrative and bureaucratic organization, political system, substantive law, and legal practice. The confusion produces uncertainty about the purpose of the evaluation. The Doing Business reports aspire to measure the ease of doing business in a country, within its legal framework. However, contrary to the oft-advanced idea, this approach involves an assessment, not of the legal system within its functional organization but rather of public policies and their implementation. In this regard, hasty conclusions recognizing a correlation between the ease of doing business and membership in a particular legal family are of dubious validity. Evaluating legal systems per se requires an assessment of the proper applicability of rules that fall within the corpus of the law, the predictability of legal solutions and the substantive guarantee of the rights recognized by legal rules. This approach perforce raises the question of legal certainty. The establishment of an index of legal certainty will contribute to an analysis of this characteristic, which is an essential attribute of the law in various national systems and at various stages of

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“…Since it is impossible to acquire data on the entire spectrum of transaction costs, we focus solely on administrative and procedural costs and their components. This article also employs data that is readily available although far from ideal and its validity has in recent years also triggered an extensive scholarly discussion (Arruñada, 2007;Arruñada & Garoupa, 2005;Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002;Djankov, McLiesh, & Ramalho, 2006;Klick, 2010;Spamann, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico

Spruk

Kovač

2019

Economics & Politics

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This paper examines the contribution of administrative and procedural transaction costs to economic growth under common legal system. We show that administrative and procedural costs vary quite a lot even within the institutional environment sharing the common legal system. States with low‐cost business registration, low‐cost access to property rights and greater judicial efficiency tend to have consistently higher growth. The established effects are robust to alternative model specifications, heterogeneity bias, and to a variety of control variables that might confound the effects of administrative and procedural costs on growth. Such differences in costs are far from being trivial as we show that these within‐system differences might be instrumental in influencing economic growth. Lower administrative and procedural costs induce growth by increasing investment rate, lowering unemployment rate, encouraging labor supply and improving total factor productivity. In the counterfactual scenario, the transition from high‐cost to low‐cost regime is associated with substantial growth and development gains over time. By exploiting the variation in the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and historical urbanization, we show that the negative effect of rising procedural and administrative costs on growth and development appears to be causal.

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Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement

Cited by 32 publications

References 13 publications

Do legal origins affect cross-country incarceration rates?

Do legal origins affect cross-country incarceration rates?

Measuring the law: Sécurité juridique as a watermark

Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico

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