2009
DOI: 10.1080/01436590902742313
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Legal Liminality: the gender and labour politics of organising South Korea's irregular workforce

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Cited by 27 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…While affirmative action applies to companies with more than 50 employees in the USA and more than 100 employees in Canada, Korean affirmative action is designed to apply only to workplaces and public companies with more than 500 employees; workplaces with less than 500 employees lie in an institutional blind spot regarding monitoring and reducing gender discrimination (Fuller and Vosko ; Chun 2009a,b; Cho et al. 2010).…”
Section: The Reasons For Gender Discrimination In Social Security Promentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While affirmative action applies to companies with more than 50 employees in the USA and more than 100 employees in Canada, Korean affirmative action is designed to apply only to workplaces and public companies with more than 500 employees; workplaces with less than 500 employees lie in an institutional blind spot regarding monitoring and reducing gender discrimination (Fuller and Vosko ; Chun 2009a,b; Cho et al. 2010).…”
Section: The Reasons For Gender Discrimination In Social Security Promentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As mentioned above, the labour market and, relatedly, labour law reform were conditional to the IMF bailout. The Korean labour market segmentation is largely based on gendered logics in which the state has, according to Chun (, 537), channelled women ‘into downgraded forms of irregular employment’.…”
Section: The Role Of Key Institutional Actors In the Labour Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some categories of non‐regular workers are not permitted by law to join the main unions (Shin ). According to a survey conducted by the Korean Ministry of Labour in , ‘only 2.5% of irregular workers are represented by a union in comparison with 15.1% of regular workers’ (cited in Chun , 536). Attempts have been made to organise the expanding category of irregular workers by new labour movement bodies, often covering specific segments of the workforce at the grassroots level (e.g.…”
Section: The Role Of Key Institutional Actors In the Labour Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following this “grand social compromise”, as it is known in Korea, non‐standard employment relations rapidly expanded, as did mass layoffs. Female workers in particular found that in many cases they were the first to be fired and/or (re)hired under temporary contracts, and they continue to be more likely to have a non‐standard employment status (Chun, , pp. 538–541).…”
Section: The Double Transitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead of fighting for independent unions and against authoritarian government, labour struggles increasingly targeted the status of the employment relation itself. What Jennifer Chun (, p. 537) describes as the “legal liminality” of non‐standard employment status – “a state of institutional exception in which workers are neither fully protected by nor fully denied the rights of formal employment” (a phrase that is in many ways emblematic of the postdemocratic condition) – has become one of the main objects of labour struggles since the crisis. It is in this context – the decline of authoritarian repression spurred by a decade of grassroots labour activism enabled by the 1987 democratic transition and multi‐scalar pressure for reform, but also the rollout of neoliberal labour market reform – that Korea's new “postdemocratic” mode of labour control slowly began to emerge.…”
Section: The Double Transitionmentioning
confidence: 99%