Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers' Dilemma

Abstract

Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action mandates, like many other laws regulating organizations, do not clearly define what constitutes compliance. Thus compliance depends largely on the initiative and agenda of those persons within organizations who are charged with managing the compliance effort: in the case of civil rights, “affirmative action officers.” This paper draws on case studies of affirmative action officers to suggest that the political climate within which affirmative action officers work, together with the officers' interpretations of the law, their role conceptions, and their professional aspirations have important implications for the nature and extent of organizational compliance with law. We conclude that compliance should be understood as a process that evolves over time rather than as a discrete event or non‐event.

The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth

“…Thus, we expect that factors that render organizations more sensitive to their legal environments (sector and contractor status), and the presence of internal offices and staff that demonstrate attention to civil rights law (EEO offices and the presence of an EEO counselor), will increase the overall volume of complaints, both external and internal. The presence of other internal structures is likely to be particularly important since these structures tend to generate agendas that foster attention to EEO ideals (Edelman et al 1991;Edelman and Petterson 1999). EEO office staffs and counselors may develop commitments to EEO goals and encourage employees to challenge discrimination (Edelman et al 1991).…”

“…The presence of other internal structures is likely to be particularly important since these structures tend to generate agendas that foster attention to EEO ideals (Edelman et al 1991;Edelman and Petterson 1999). EEO office staffs and counselors may develop commitments to EEO goals and encourage employees to challenge discrimination (Edelman et al 1991). Further, EEO office staff and counselors are likely to encourage the use of internal procedures because they believe in their capacity to reduce external complaints and lawsuits.…”

“…4b). 15 We obtain these interpretations for organizations with complaints and without as follows: for size, B ϭ .17 ϫ .3033 ϭ .05 per hundred (or .5/thousand) and .17 ϫ .0782 ϭ .013/ hundred or 13%/thousand; for percentage minority, B ϭ 3.72 ϫ .3033 ϭ 1.13 (ϫ.1) ϭ .11 and 3.72 ϫ .0782 ϭ .29 (ϫ.1) ϭ 3% per 10% increase; for contractor, B ϭ 1.92 ϫ .3033 ϭ .58 and 1.92 ϫ .0782 ϭ .15. may encourage employees to pursue those rights (Edelman et al 1991). Having an EEO office increases the expected number of complaints by almost one full complaint (3.1 ϫ .3033 ϭ .94) and raises the probability of experiencing any complaint by 26% (3.1 ϫ .0844 ϭ .26).…”

The Meaning of Ethnic Equality in Scandinavian Anti-Discrimination Legislation

“…This stands in contrast to countries like Norway and Sweden where historical legacies of racial or ethnic discrimination are less apparent. At the same time, some studies have investigated the legal ambiguity that accompanies affirmative action or equal employment opportunity mandates, and have found that it is often unclear what constitutes compliance with the law (Edelman et al 1991). The authors argue that the political climate within the organization, together with factors such as the officers' interpretation of the law and their professional aspirations, have important implications for the nature and extent of organizational compliance with affirmative action legislation.…”

Marking Their Own Homework: The Pragmatic and Moral Legitimacy of Industry Self-Regulation

“…Industries can self-regulate because of legal ambiguity, or because stakeholders demand social performance that is higher than current regulatory requirements (Edelman et al 1991;Gunningham and Rees 1997). For example, Zietsma and Lawrence's (2010) study of the evolution of decisions on harvesting practices in the British Columbia forest industry showed how managers actively participated in creating, maintaining and disrupting industry collective actions.…”