Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to Government Performance Information

Holbein, John B.

doi:10.1017/s0003055416000071

Cited by 76 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 77 publications

(101 reference statements)

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“…This may be especially true when performance outcomes are public information (Hong and Kim ; Kim and Hong ). Research also suggests that citizens reward or punish public managers based on published agency performance information (e.g., Holbein ; James and John ; Marvel ; Rothbart et al ; but see Meier, Johnson, and An ). Given such evidence, political principals may also view agency performance information as an indicator of managerial competence (Gallo and Lewis ).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When performance information about public service is publicly available, elected officials may choose to attribute responsibility for poor performance outcomes to someone else to “deflect blame by blaming others” (Weaver , 385; see also Nielsen and Moynihan ). Studies have consistently shown that performance information about public service affects the electoral outcomes of the responsible policy makers (Berry and Howell ; Boyne et al ; Holbein ; James and John ; James and Moseley ). Given that citizens use performance information about public service to vote against incumbent politicians, those elected officials may thus have a strong incentive to shift blame to public managers (James et al ).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias

Hong

Kim

2019

Public Administration Review

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This article explores how political principals weigh loyalty and competence in public personnel decisions. Exploiting the abrupt shift in political leadership following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye of Korea, the authors examine how the newly elected president made the decision to retain or dismiss 118 agency heads appointed by the previous administration. The evidence shows the importance of loyalty in managerial survival: those who had a political patronage relationship with the ousted president were less likely to survive in the new administration. However, the authors also demonstrate the relevance of competence, as measured by the outcomes of agency performance evaluation. Further, the article shows the existence of negativity bias: the punishment for low performance is greater than the reward for high performance. Finally, the authors provide support for the idea that political principals reward loyalists, but only if they show acceptable levels of competence. Evidence for Practice• This study explores how political principals weigh loyalty and competence in public personnel decisions. • Political principals' punishment for low performance is greater than their rewards for good performance. • Political principals reward loyalists, but only if they show acceptable levels of competence.• The availability of performance information may protect bureaucratic expertise from political opportunism.

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias

Hong

Kim

2019

Public Administration Review

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“…Parental satisfaction is also correlated to school letter grades, which are mostly based on test scores (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2012), and this satisfaction changes as school grades change (Jacobsen and Saultz 2013). Holbein (2016) finds that parents, especially white, affluent citizens, begin to exit schools once they learn that the schools have failed to meet the federal Annual Yearly Progress standard, also based on test scores. Beyond parents, citizens attitudes concerning school quality are also reflective of information about student achievement (Chingos, Henderson, and West 2012).…”

Section: Retrospective Voting and Test Scoresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Buck Stops with the Education Mayor: Mayoral Control and Local Test Scores in U.S. Urban Mayoral Elections

Lay

Tyburski

2017

Politics & Policy

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Several U.S. cities have turned control of their schools from elected boards to the mayor. Advocates of mayoral control have argued that this structure allows voters to hold the mayor directly accountable for the performance of local schools. Now that public schools have to report their test scores each year, it is possible for voters to attribute responsibility for test scores. This article analyzes survey data from 16 cities in the United States that have been matched with data on test scores. We find that, in general, test score changes are not associated with support for incumbent mayors, except in districts with mayoral control, where voters reward incumbents when test scores rise. Further, voters' beliefs about local schools condition their support for the incumbent. In cities with mayoral control, voters who evaluate schools positively reward mayors while voters who believe their schools are poor are not swayed by this positive information. Related Articles Related Media Baltimore Sun. . “Make the Mayor Accountable for the Schools.” February 23. http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-city-schools-20170223-story.html BethFertig. . “After 12 Years of Bloomberg, Data Reigns in the Schools.” WNYC. http://www.wnyc.org/story/303900-bloombergs-schools-legacy-use-data/

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“…Research suggests that poor government performance shapes citizens’ political behaviours. For example, Kogan et al () show that citizens are less likely to support school tax levies if a local school district is given a low performance score (also see Holbein ). Importantly, a growing literature indicates that there is a negativity bias in the way in which citizens respond to performance information; generally, the public is shown to be more responsive to information indicating negative performance than information indicating positive performance (see James and John ; Boyne et al ; James ; James and Moseley ; Olsen )…”

Section: Performance Measurement and The Electoral Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

Miller

2017

Public Administration

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Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators’ focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators’ attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non‐elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.

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Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to Government Performance Information

Abstract: We are transforming our schools . . . . We are insisting on accountability, empowering parents . . . and making sure that local people are in charge. We will leave no child behind.

Cited by 76 publications

References 77 publications

Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias

Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias

The Buck Stops with the Education Mayor: Mayoral Control and Local Test Scores in U.S. Urban Mayoral Elections

How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

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