2020
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.5.tsch
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Least-cost Distribution Network Tariff Design in Theory and Practice

Abstract: In this paper a game-theoretical model with self-interest pursuing consumers is introduced to assess how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under two constraints that regulators typically face. The first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, socalled cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There is a fear that active consumers investi… Show more

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Cited by 31 publications
(18 citation statements)
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References 47 publications
(77 reference statements)
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“…A non-cooperative game is proposed in [27], where different tariff structures are evaluated, and their impacts on the electricity users are studied. This work is further developed in [28], where the authors introduce three types of fee to design the distribution tariff: energy, power and fixed; considering prospective, in additional to sunk costs, to set the tariff level. In [9], the design of cost-reflective distribution tariffs is addressed, introducing a model in which users can react to high distribution charges by deploying fix-sized DER installations in order to reduce their electricity bills.…”
Section: Notationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A non-cooperative game is proposed in [27], where different tariff structures are evaluated, and their impacts on the electricity users are studied. This work is further developed in [28], where the authors introduce three types of fee to design the distribution tariff: energy, power and fixed; considering prospective, in additional to sunk costs, to set the tariff level. In [9], the design of cost-reflective distribution tariffs is addressed, introducing a model in which users can react to high distribution charges by deploying fix-sized DER installations in order to reduce their electricity bills.…”
Section: Notationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the electricity sector in particular, it has also been increasingly applied. The model used in this paper is an extended version of that used in Schittekatte and Meeus (2020), which in turn builds on Schittekatte et al (2018). It has the same game-theoretical set-up.…”
Section: Modelling Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conversely, a value of 1 means that a consumer demand reduction of 1 kW will reduce the system peak by 1 kW and consequently reduce grid investments. A similar approach to grid cost representation is used in Schittekatte and Meeus (2020). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers…”
Section: Maximisementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Several authors used the bi-level set-up to show how consumers react to different types of tariffs, such as fixed, volumetric or capacity-based tariffs, with different levels of locational and spatial granularity. These studies have highlighted the importance of costreflective distribution tariffs to align consumers' interest with the system needs ( (Schittekatte et al, 2018), (Govaerts et al, 2021), (Schittekatte and Meeus, 2020), (Pediaditis et al, 2021), and (Hoarau and Perez, 2019)). The model we developed in our previous paper, Nouicer et al (2021), was the first to include the option for the DSO to curtail demand for a fixed compensation in a bilevel set-up.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%