‘Learning How Not to Be Good’: Machiavelli and the Standard Dirty Hands Thesis

Abstract

'Learning how not to be good': Machiavelli and the Standard Dirty Hands Thesis. Abstract'It is necessary to a Prince to learn how not to be good'. This quotation from Machiavelli's The Prince has become the mantra of the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis. Despite its infamy, it features proudly in most conventional expositions of the dirty hands (DH) problem, including Michael Walzer's original analysis. In this paper, I wish to cast a doubt as to whether the standard conception of the problem of DH-the recognition that, in certain inescapable and tragic circumstances an innocent course of action is unfeasiblefully captures Machiavelli's message and its terrifying implications. In particular, I argue that the standard DH thesis is inadequately 'static': it conceives the conflict between ordinary morality and political morality as a stark, momentary and rare paradox of action-an anomaly disrupting the normality of harmony. As such it misconceives both the extent and the nature of the rupture between morality and politics. In this sense, the argument I shall advance does not just involve an exercise in the history of political thought. Rather, I want to suggest that, by virtue of its failure to take Machiavelli's insights seriously, the standard DH thesis fails to live up to its purported capacity to capture the complexity and fragmentation of our moral cosmos and that, consequently, it is nothing more than a thinly veiled version of the idealism and monism it purports to reject. Keywords Machiavelli; Dirty hands; Moral conflict; Political virtue; Moral vice; Innocence IntroductionCynicism about politics is ubiquitous and not without reason. In his famous essay Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, Michael Walzer (1973: 163) remarks that, it is the "'conventional wisdom'" that "politicians are a good deal worse, morally worse, than the rest of us". This attitude, he maintains, should not be explained with reference to cases of mere sleaze but should be traced to a different, more unsettling, concern: the dirty hands (DH) problem.Reduced to its essentials, the Walzerian vogue of the DH problem holds that, in certain tragic circumstances, politicians may be required from a normative and prudential perspective to do or tolerate things that are immoral. For instance, they might have to torture terrorists in order to divulge life-saving information or deceive for the sake of political success. The DH thesis suggests that, in such instances, there exists a disharmony between ordinary morality -which is, as claimed, deontological -and the demands of successful political action -which are thought to be consequentialist 1 . And whilst the 1 Several DH theorists suggest that Walzer's (1973) original conception of DH is too narrow: they argue that, like Machiavelli, Walzer unsatisfactorily restricts DH to politicians; whilst politics is somehow special, the DH dilemma

After the Standard Dirty Hands Thesis: Towards a Dynamic Account of Dirty Hands in Politics

“…But, the virtuous politician should repudiate her innocence-as-a-disposition at the time she decides to become a politician. And this, pace Walzer, may occur long before she becomes guilty of wrongdoing -before she becomes dirty-handed in the traditional sense (Tillyris, 2014). It is to the conception of DH in politics in dynamic terms I turn.…”

“…Contra the politician the static DH thesis presents us withan individual who enters politics as an innocent man, ignorant of the realities of political practice, and who is overburdened by guilt or 'tragic remorse' upon acting immorally (akin to someone faced with an unanticipated misfortune) -Machiavelli's experienced politician expects that in politics his choices will frequently be between two incompatible 'oughts' and involve 'static' DH (Tillyris, 2014;Hampshire, 1989). Such conflicts, Berlin writes, "will be acute and extreme" only "for those who are not prepared to abandon either course": those like Walzer's innocent politician who erroneously assume "that the two incompatible lives are in fact, after all, reconcilable" (1981: 66).…”

“…Pace Walzer, not only should the politician conceal her dirt after acting immorally (Tillyris, 2014), but the task of hypocritical concealment should commence at the time she enters politics. It is unsurprising, then, that the 'static' DH thesis cannot capture hypocrisy.…”

“…These 'broader' accounts of DH are Walzerian still. And this standard Walzerian conception of DH in politics does not suffice; despite its professed Machiavellian lineage, it misconstrues Machiavelli's point: it fails to capture the fragmentation of morality and messiness of politics and collapses into the idealism it purportedly rejects 3 (Tillyris, 2014). The standard DH thesis is 'static': it conceives of the conflict between morality and politics as a momentary, surmountable anomaly disrupting the normality of harmony.…”

Political Integrity and Dirty Hands: Compromise and the Ambiguities of Betrayal

“…Whilst DH theorists claim to be sensitive to the moral messiness of politics, their account, I argue, is susceptible to a similar sort of moralism exhibited by critics of compromise: DH theorists cannot capture the complexity of compromise and its ubiquitous necessity 3 This paradox is captured by Gutmann and Thompson: whilst there is great "public support for compromise in general" and in the abstract, they note, the public is unsupportive of concrete compromises on particular issues such as "immigration, taxation, government spending, the environment" or "abortion" (2012, p. 26). 4 I defend this controversial point in more detail and set the general foundations of this practice-based approach to political ethics in Tillyris (2015a;2015b). 5 I say partly because, as I explain, the negative view is also expressed by politicians for political reasons.…”