Learning by Failing

Abstract

Learning from failing. The origins of the Norwegian oil fund The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global is the world's largest sovereign wealth fund. 1 At present, it has a market value of about NOK 7,100 billion (USD 815 billion), which is around 140 per cent of Norway's GDP. This is a result not only of high levels of petroleum revenue, but also of a solution whereby government revenue is channelled straight into the fund and invested abroad, with clear rules for how capital can be fed back into the Norwegian economy through annual political decisions on balancing the government budget. And it is only the return on the fund that can be used in this way; the capital invested is not available for consumption and must remain in global capital markets. The principles behind the fund have won international recognition as a well thought-out solution for managing large inflows of commodity revenue in a relatively small economy. The apparent success seems to have shaped a more general understanding of cleverness and foresight in the making of the fund, and, in a larger perspective, of the Norwegian State's handling of petroleum incomes in general. 2 The fund was established by the Norwegian Parliament rather late in the Norwegian oil history, in 1990. This means that the relevant bill was prepared at the same time as Johan P.

Ideological Dilemmas Actualised by the Idea of Living Environmentally Childfree

“…Opinion responding critically to Saetre (2013) The Norwegian welfare system, including generous family policies, is usually associated with the country's petroleum resources, manifested in the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign wealth fund (Lie, 2018). While both Ellingsaeter (2012) and Kristensen (2020) showed how concern for the welfare state's sustainability plays a part in the public discourse surrounding fertility rates, a recent report surprisingly suggested that decreasing fertility rates are actually good for the Norwegian state finances (Bjertnaes et al, 2019).…”

Hard talk, costly walk: The evolution of a soft budget constraint syndrome in a football club at the periphery of Europe

“…Nevertheless, the BC walk materialized through significant BC interventions that added softness to the clubs’ BC approach. Eventually, the financial management of the club was unable to “shake free” of its soft economic history ( 64 ), and the SBC syndrome was taken for granted and became institutionalized ( 63 ). This finding implies that we must primarily study clubs’ behavior and not their rhetoric to gain better insight into which BC approach they follow.…”

“…In contrast to many other countries that have discovered valuable natural resources such as oil and gas, Norway has shown great discipline in managing the funds from the extraction to benefit both current and future generations ( 64 ). An HBC culture may therefore be a characteristic of this country.…”

Relative Abundance in the Land of Oil: Reorganization of Extractive Resource Governance in Decentralizing Indonesia

“…Government failures, both at the national and subnational levels, in the governance of extractive industries can also be found in various other parts of the world, particularly in South America, such as Peru (Yanguas, 2011;Ponce and Mc Clintock, 2014), Argentina (Rioseco, 2016), Colombia (Rodriguez, 2020), Nicaragua (Larson, 2002), Venezuela (Hammond, 2011); and some African countries, namely Uganda (Holterman, 2014), Ghana (Ayelazuno, 2014), Angola and Nigeria (Ovadia, 2014), and Sierra Leone (Voors et al, 2017). On the other hand, the extractive industry governance practices implemented by several countries such as Norway (Lie, 2018), Australia (Cleary, 2016), Chile, Malaysia, and Botswana (Rosser, 2006and Kolstad and Wiig, 2008in Feryawan, 2011) are considered by scholars as successful ideal examples. Why, then, can a country's abundance of extractive natural resources be positively correlated with development on the one hand and negatively correlated on the other?…”