Learning and selection

Abstract

Are learning processes selection processes? This paper takes a slightly modified version of the account of selection presented in Hull et al. (Behav Brain Sci 24:511-527, 2001) and asks whether it applies to learning processes. The answer is that although some learning processes are selectional, many are not. This has consequences for teleological theories of mental content. According to these theories, mental states have content in virtue of having proper functions, and they have proper functions in virtue of being the products of selection processes. For some mental states, it is plausible that the relevant selection process is natural selection, but there are many for which it is not plausible. One response to this (due to David Papineau) is to suggest that the learning processes by which we acquire non-innate mental states are selection processes and can therefore confer proper functions on mental states. This paper considers two ways in which this response could be elaborated, and argues that neither of them succeed: the teleosemanticist cannot rely on the claim that learning processes are selection processes in order to justify the attribution of proper functions to beliefs.

Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents

“…We indicated our view that, if new functions can arise over the lifetime of the individual, then perhaps new representations could arise over the lifetime of the individual, too. Kingsbury (2008), however, raises a challenge to the idea of functions that do not derive from intergenerational evolutionary selection. Proponents of the selected effects theory have often maintained that functions require something like differential reproduction or "copying."…”

A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function

“…organism can learn by modeling the behavior of another, even if there is nothing like selection taking place. Kingsbury (2008) offers such reasons in her criticism of SE theorists' appeal to trial-and-error learning. Moreover, there may be other ways that a behavior can acquire a novel function (for example, because it is an adaptation shaped by natural selection).…”

“…Is this a case of "differential retention?" If so, is hardness in rocks a function (see Kingsbury 2008)? Similar examples can be multiplied indefinitely.…”

Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience

“…Kingsbury (2008), for example, imagines a collection of rocks on the beach that vary with respect to their hardness, and where this variation determines how long each rock will survive before being turned into sand. This case exhibits differential persistence, yet it seems counterintuitive to say that the hardness of the rock has the function of enabling it to survive the action of the waves (ibid., 496; also see Okasha 2003, 746;Schaffner 1993, 383).…”

“…Here, one must be cautious to avoid the temptation to overgeneralize the role of selection in learning. Kingsbury (2008) is a critical response to recent attempts, such as Hull et al 2001, to apply the selection model to learning. In particular, she notes that not all forms of learning require selection.…”