Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats

Manulak, Michael W.

doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9245-0

Cited by 37 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…It is easier for individual states to lobby the agent in all obscurity away from the oversight of the other member states. It is therefore important to not only focus on the power of the individual member states (Stone, ; Manulak, ; Urpelainen, ), but also the institutional design of the agent (Eckhard, ). Equally, researchers who study the policy‐making influence of international public administrations (Bauer et al., ; Eckhard and Ege, ; Hawkins et al., ; Johnson, ; Johnson and Uperlainen, ) should consider the possibility of informal lobbying.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this article, we consider (1) decision‐making and (2) policy implementation as two distinct arenas where conflict between the member states plays out. This implies that member states which ‘win’ in one arena can accept a ‘loss’ in the other arena (Manulak, ; Urpelainen, ). It also gives member states a choice where they fight their battles: before or after delegation.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Contested Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While strong states are obviously in a position to substantially affect decision‐making and implementation (e.g. Dijkstra, ; Panke, ; Stone, ), they are likely to be even more powerful during implementation (Manulak, ; Urpelainen, ). During formal decision‐making, member states have to collectively agree and often require consensus.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Contested Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo

Eckhard

Dijkstra

2017

Global Policy

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International organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve political disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to influence policy implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects the opportunities for such unilateral influence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three international organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding missions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states exert unilateral influence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo. Policy Implications• Policy implementation by international organizations can be as politically contested as the decision-making by member states. Rather than avoiding the delegation of policy implementation, states should seek to balance between who gains during decision-making and who gains during implementation.• Strong states have a disproportionate amount of influence over policy implementation. Weaker states should focus on the institutional constrains in which such unilateral influence plays out. This is an effective method of setting boundaries.• The stricter collective control mechanisms in international organizations, the less likely individual member states exert unwanted unilateral influence. States should, however, also recognize that strict collective control often comes at the expense of the quality of policy implementation.• The nitty-gritty institutional rules on staffing and budget allocation significantly affect how individual states can influence policy implementation by international organizations. States should be aware that these politics of bureaucratic resourcing can also undermine the quality of policy implementation.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Contested Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Contested Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo

Eckhard

Dijkstra

2017

Global Policy

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“…Recent literature emphasizes that states can control the resources of an agency in order to limit its autonomy (Brown, ; Heldt and Schmidtke, ; Ege and Bauer, ; Manulak, ; Squatrito, ). One such resource is staff (Parízek, ).…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives: State Influence At International Omentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When it comes to designing such new venues, Manulak () shows that powerful states prefer weak secretariats over powerful secretariats in institutional design negotiations and that the actual design reflects their bargaining clout with respect to less powerful states that favor stronger secretariats. In a similar vein, Stone () argues that powerful states often commit to limit their own formal power because they expect downstream informal influence advantages.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives: State Influence At International Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust Funds as a Lever of Influence at International Development Organizations

Reinsberg

2017

Global Policy

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Trust funds -broadly defined as financial vehicles to channel development funding earmarked for specific purposes through international development organizations -have grown substantially over the past two decades. Reflecting the variety of trust fund purposes and related governance arrangements, an emergent literature emphasizes a diversity of reasons underlying this growth. This paper proposes a simple -yet encompassing -explanation applicable to all kinds of funds: donors use trust funds to wield 'influence' -leveraging financial resources to alter the policies of multilateral organizations. Based on interviews at the World Bank, the study shows that influence is a dominant motive behind trust funds, though the capacity and willingness to wield influence varies across donors. Influence is a salient motive especially for medium-sized donors and emerging donors but surprisingly less so for large donors. In addition, attempts of influence are most effective when donors promote new thematic issues that did not previously feature Bank assistance and outside established programs. Concerns among stakeholders about undue donor influence are highest with respect to the global knowledge work of the World Bank but are virtually absent when involving donors in the operational activities at the country level. Policy Implications• Policy-makers need to be aware that trust funds are prone to be used as levers of influence.• Donor involvement in multilateral agency operations can enhance the effectiveness of operations but at the same time undermine the legitimacy of global governance; stakeholders must find a balance between these two considerations.• International development organizations should have clear guidelines regarding which kinds of donor involvement they can accept and which practices of involvement are incommensurate with their own procedural rules; they must communicate these guidelines internally and vis-a-vis external stakeholders.• Sectors that are prone to undue influence -for example global knowledge work -should be financed from core contributions.

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Developing countries and international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

McArthur

Werker

2016

Rev Int Organ

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We describe four megatrends since the end of the Cold War that relate to developing countries: a greater share of the global economy; more accessible technologies, particularly in communication; breakthroughs in global cooperation in tackling basic human needs; and the evolution of a complex set of problems in spite of the progress. We then examine potential political economy channels that might hinder the ability of international organizations to adapt to the new realities. Introducing the articles to the special issue, we argue for four distinct variables that affect the behavior and character of international organizations: power, norms, preferences, and problems.Keywords International organizations . Developing countries . Political economy . Power . Norms . Preferences . Global governance The world of 2015, when the submissions for this special issue were received, was substantially different from the post-WWII world when the modern system of global governance through international organizations was established. In particular, the role and reach of developing countries and their citizens was in the midst of a major transformation. This special issue examines how, and how well, international organizations (IOs) are operating in this changed world. This journal, among others, has Rev Int Organ (2016) 11:155-169

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Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats

Cited by 37 publications

References 30 publications

Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo

Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo

Trust Funds as a Lever of Influence at International Development Organizations

Developing countries and international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

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