Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem

Abstract

[eng] In this paper, I propose a survey on the economic literature dealing with the balance between specific and ad vabrem taxation. Three lessons emerge from this literature. First, predominantly specific taxation leads to relatively high price and profits and a relatively low fiscal revenue. Second, no general rule indicate which type of taxation is the best instrument as this choice is closely link to the market structure and/or to the government's objective. Third, even if a lot of works have been done on this debate, there still exist many gaps to fill. [fre] L'objectif principal de cet article est de faire le point sur la littérature économique traitant du choix entre taxe ad valorem (taxe sur la valeur des ventes) et taxe unitaire (taxe sur le volume des ventes). Trois enseignements majeurs sont mis en évidence. Premièrement, une prédominance de la taxe unitaire conduit à des prix, des profits, une qualité relativement élevés, et une recette fiscale plutôt faible. Deuxièmement, il n'existe pas de règle générale permettant de statuer sur le choix du type de taxe à utiliser. En effet, ce choix est étroitement lié à la structure du marché étudié et à l'objectif poursuivi par le gouvernement. Troisièmement, même s'il y a eu beaucoup d'avancées, il existe encore de nombreuses zones d'ombres qui peuvent faire l'objet de travaux intéressants.

Evaluation of the new ECOWAS directive on tobacco taxation

“…points out that The Gambia, which applies a speci c duty (rarely applied by EU countries), recovers more than 60% of tobacco excise revenues [7]. The ongoing study for Ghana may shed more light on this link, as the country adopts an aggressive tax strategy precisely to increase government tax revenues.…”

“…The effectiveness of a tax system depends on a few factors, including the extent to which rms pass on increased taxes to their customers. This pass-through depends on the structure of the taxes but also on the con guration of the market, which may or may not give market power to incumbent rms [7]. This pass-through depends on the structure of the taxes but also on the con guration of the market, which may or may not give market power to incumbent rms [7].…”

“…This pass-through depends on the structure of the taxes but also on the con guration of the market, which may or may not give market power to incumbent rms [7]. This pass-through depends on the structure of the taxes but also on the con guration of the market, which may or may not give market power to incumbent rms [7]. The sub regional market is characterized by oligopolistic competition, while domestic markets are dominated by a private quasi-monopoly, except in Cape Verde where it is public [1].…”