Laypeople Are Strategic Essentialists, Not Genetic Essentialists

Abstract

In the last third of the twentieth century, humanists and social scientists argued that attention to genetics would heighten already‐existing genetic determinism, which in turn would intensify negative social outcomes, especially sexism, racism, ableism, and harshness to criminals. They assumed that laypeople are at risk of becoming genetic essentialists. I will call this the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” This model has not accurately predicted psychosocial impacts of findings from genetics research. I will be arguing that the failure of the model can be traced to its inability to recognize the complexity of laypeople’s attitudes; its incorrect theory of how beliefs, attitudes, and discourse function; and its blindness to how academics’ own interests can override the available evidence. More specifically, I suggest that the substantial data about laypeople’s deployment of genetics supports what I will call the “laypeople are strategic essentialists model” better than the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” The strategic essentialists model holds that people tend to store multiple categories, including multiple causal forces, that they deploy “strategically” to serve context‐dependent goals. It will be difficult for academics to reorient ourselves to model laypeople as sophisticated strategic essentialists rather than as naïve genetic essentialists. Perhaps a little shift, however, will be of value.

Making Sense of Genetics: The Problem of Essentialism

“…It seems that when people consider the role of biology in sexual orientation, they are more likely to think different kinds of sexual orientation to be “natural” and thus more acceptable. This example echoes a point raised by Condit’s essay in this special report, showing how people may employ their essentialist attitudes about genes in a strategic way . When essentialist views are consistent with people’s own preferences, they may embrace them, whereas when these views are inconsistent with their preferences, they may staunchly reject them.…”

“…We are not claiming that the only thoughts that people have about genes are ones that are consistent with these essentialist biases. Celeste Condit is indeed correct in highlighting, in her essay in this special report, that people have competing thoughts about causality and that particular circumstances can lead one kind of cause to be prioritized over another . We are arguing, however, that people’s essentialist intuitions make genetic attributions particularly potent, which can often lead them to have undue influence on people’s judgments.…”

Genomic Essentialism: Its Provenance and Trajectory as an Anticipatory Ethical Concern

“…Studies suggest, for example, that lay public perceptions of diseases include both genetic and nongenetic but significant inputs, including behaviors, physical environments, spiritual factors, and personal will . In this special report, Condit further argues that hyperbolic statements about genetic causation are not indicative of genomic illiteracy or deterministic beliefs but, rather, a reflection of people—among the lay public and experts alike—being “strategic essentializers,” resorting to essentialist beliefs only when it suits personalized, contextualized needs . We agree that people are strategic players, regardless of their level of genomic literacy, and that genomic isms terminology does not on its own resolve the social harms of racism, sexism, ableism, and similar isms.…”

“…Likewise, while perceptions of genetic fatalism are triggered by views of genetic essentialism, determinism, and reductionism, they are also tangled with genetic meliorism that offers a potential remedy through genetic manipulation (such as gene editing) . Concurrently, as Celeste Condit highlights in her contribution to this special report, genomic racism is not necessarily grounded in genomics but in prevalent societal notions of racism (and, by extension, of sexism, ableism, and so forth). That is, genomics serves as a mask, but not as a cause, for those who already endorse essentialist views of race, sex, and abilities.…”

“…81 In this special report, Condit further argues that hyperbolic statements about genetic causation are not indicative of genomic illiteracy or deterministic beliefs but, rather, a reflection of people-among the lay public and experts alike-being "strategic essentializers," resorting to essentialist beliefs only when it suits personalized, contextualized needs. 82 We agree that people are strategic players, regardless of their level of genomic literacy, and that genomic isms terminol-If we hope to break the cycle of genomic isms, we will have to get better at resisting overinterpretations of the relevance that genomics has for people' s future potentials, ancestral vulnerabilities, community memberships, and ethnic affiliations.…”