Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization

Abstract

Lawyers for conservative and libertarian causes are active in organizing and mobilizing interest groups within the conservative coalition, and networks of relationships among those lawyers help to maintain and shape the coalition. Using data gathered in interviews with seventy‐two such lawyers, this article analyzes characteristics of the lawyers and the structure of their networks. The findings suggest that the networks are divided into segments or blocks that are identified with particular constituencies, but that a distinct set of actors with extensive relationships serves to bridge the constituencies. Measures of centrality and brokerage confirm the structural importance of these actors in the network, and a search of references in news media confirms their prominence or prestige. This “core” set of actors occupies the “structural hole” in the network that separates the business constituency from religious conservatives. Libertarians, located near the core of the network, also occupy an intermediate position. Regression analysis of ties within the network suggests that the Federalist Society plays an important role in bringing the lawyers together.

Public Interest Law Organizations and the Two-Tier System of Access to Justice in the United States

“…A few basic descriptive studies of PILOs exist from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Handler, Ginsburg, and Snow 1978;Aron 1989), but public interest law expanded dramatically over the last three decades and these studies are outdated. Although there has been a renaissance in scholarship about public interest practice and cause lawyers Scheingold 1998, 2006), much of the empirical research focuses on particular segments of the public interest bar (Houck 1984;Olson 1984;Heinz, Paik, and Southworth 2003;Southworth 2004Southworth , 2009Paik, Southworth, and Heinz, 2007), or on cause lawyering at the individual, rather than organizational, level (Kilwein 1998). Several studies examine lawyers and organizational settings in other segments of the bar, such as inhouse counsel in large corporations (Nelson and Nielsen 2000), sole practitioners and lawyers in small firms (Sarat and Felstiner 1989;Seron 1996;Mather et al 2001), large firm lawyers (Nelson 1988;Galanter and Palay 1991), pro bono work within large firms (Cummings 2004;Sandefur 2007a;Boutcher 2009Boutcher , 2013, and lawyer/ lobbyists (Heinz et al 1993).…”

Relational Embeddedness and Socially Motivated Case Screening in the Practice of Law in Rural China

“…Along this line, many have explored how social capital helps lawyers improve work satisfaction (Kay and Wallace 2009), boost collegial support and trust (Kay and Hagan 1999;Wallace 2013), promote career commitment (Kay and Hagan 2003), enhance professional competence (Levin 2004), obtain higher income and status (Heinz et al 2005;Kim 2009b;Kim and Laumann 2003), mitigate market uncertainty (Kim 2009a), and secure partnership and promotion within law firms (Kay and Hagan 1999). Some have also examined how networking contributes to lawyers' efforts to build coalitions among different constituencies and, in turn, paves the way for concerted policy-making (Heinz, Paik, and Southworth 2003;Paik, Heinz, and Southworth 2011;Paik, Southworth, and Heinz 2007). Within this scholarship, social capital is often construed as inherently positive resources lawyers mobilize to advance their career goals (Dinovitzer 2006).…”

Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement

“…By "highlighting areas of agreement, reinforcing common commitments, and identifying opportunities to work together," these institutions maintain "channels of communication through which individuals and organizations can exercise political influence" (Southworth 2008, 135,141). Drawing on a previous study, which used network mapping to show the relative influence of various actors within the coalition, she shows that the legal actors with the highest degree of connectivity all were active participants in the Federalist Society (Paik, Southworth, and Heinz 2007;Southworth 2008, 144). Southworth concedes that these contacts among Society lawyers "may produce nothing more than .…”