Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950

Musacchio, Aldo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1086450

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Because of the tractable nature of government regulations and the fact that firms’ compliance is compulsory, reasonable inferences can be made about organizational learning in this setting. Last, Brazil’s economy, representative of many emerging market economies, is known for an exceedingly difficult institutional landscape to navigate because of strong development dependencies between the government and industry (Evans, 1979; Schneider, 2008; Schneider, 2009) and other non–market factors (i.e., weak rule of law, weak investor protections, and high ownership concentration) (Musacchio, 2008: 7). This setting provides a valid reference point for gauging firms’ abilities to navigate institutional differences.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Does Prior Experience Pay? Institutional Experience and the Multinational Corporation

Perkins

2014

Administrative Science Quarterly

132

129

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This study reexamines organizational learning theories to reconcile the conditions under which prior internationalization experience leads to performance gains for multinational corporations (MNCs) with varying host-country institutional experiences in different regulatory environments. Using field studies on telecommunications regulation, executive interviews conducted in Brazil, Spain, Portugal, Canada, and the U.S., and foreign direct investment data for 96 subunit operations investing in the Brazilian telecommunications industry from 1997 to 2004, I develop an experiential-learning theoretical framework to explain the mechanisms driving MNCs’ performance in subsequent host-country institutional environments given the prior experience they acquired in 80 heterogeneous regulatory environments. I predict and find that MNCs with highly similar institutional experience compared with the target country’s institutional environment will succeed. Empirical evidence suggests that similarity, breadth, and depth of prior regulatory experience significantly prolong survival. In contrast, firms with institutional experience unrelated to the target country’s regulatory environment experience learning penalties and are six times more likely to fail. These findings suggest that variations in learning contexts affect organizations’ learning curves.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Does Prior Experience Pay? Institutional Experience and the Multinational Corporation

Perkins

2014

Administrative Science Quarterly

132

129

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“…The findings are of relevance to the view that the permissive nature of UK company law was a major weakness at the time (Cottrell, 1980, p.54;Kennedy, 1987, p.127). Furthermore, we contribute to the literature which has looked at the role played by corporate by-laws in the evolution of early public and private corporations (Hilt, 2008;Musacchio, 2008Musacchio, , 2009Bodenhorn, 2012;Freeman et al, 2012;Foremen-Peck and Hannah, 2015;Guinnane et al, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Contracting, Law and Finance

2019

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In the late nineteenth century Britain had almost no mandatory shareholder protections, but had very developed financial markets. We argue that private contracting between shareholders and corporations meant that the absence of statutory protections was immaterial. Using circa 500 articles of association from before 1900, we code the protections offered to shareholders in these private contracts. We find that firms voluntarily offered shareholders many of the protections which were subsequently included in statutory corporate law. We also find that companies offering better protection to shareholders had less concentrated ownership.

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“…603 V. Item 2.4.1.6 do presente. (...)" 604 . Além disso, pareciam contribuir, efetivamente, para uma maior dispersão do capital votante das companhias então integrantes do mercado bursátil brasileiro 605 .…”

Section: Cláusulas De Limitação De Votos Na História Recente Brasileiraunclassified

Concentração e dispersão do poder político nas organizações coletivas finalísticas. Regime jurídico da companhia aberta integrante do novo mercado da bolsa de valores: o papel decisivo desempenhado pelos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação economica de acionistas no âmbito da companhia

Azevedo¹

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Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em cursodos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais-não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. Palavras-chave: Direito Societário. Direito do Mercado de Capitais. Companhias abertas. Dispersão do capital votante. Estruturas de controle societário. Instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica.

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Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

When Does Prior Experience Pay? Institutional Experience and the Multinational Corporation

When Does Prior Experience Pay? Institutional Experience and the Multinational Corporation

Private Contracting, Law and Finance

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