Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity

Abstract

Humeans and anti-Humeans agree that laws of nature should explain scientifically particular matters of fact. One objection to Humean accounts of laws contends that Humean laws cannot explain particular matters of fact because their explanations are harmfully circular. This article distinguishes between metaphysical and semantic characterizations of the circularity and argues for a new semantic version of the circularity objection. The new formulation suggests that Humean explanations are harmfully circular because the content of the sentences being explained is part of the content of the sentences doing the explaining. I describe the nature of partial content and demonstrate how this account of partial content renders Humean explanations ineffective while sparing anti-Humean explanations from the same fate. 1Introduction2Standard Formulations of the Circularity Charge3Humean Responses4Semantic Characterizations of the Circularity Worry 4.1Hempel and Oppenheim’s semantic circularity concern4.2A new version of the semantic circularity charge4.3Partial content as a guide to circularity5Humean Responses to the Semantic Circularity Charge 5.1Smuggling in metaphysics through the back door?5.2Do anti-Humean laws fare any better?5.3The over-generalization concern6ConclusionAppendix

The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature

“…11 See Schaffer 201212 This is, at least, how I understand the metaphysical circularity problem, which is the main topic of the paper. Some authors have recently argued that Humeans also face a problem with semantic circularity(Roski 2018, Shumener 2019. In other work(Kovacs ms), I argue that this problem ultimately collapses into the metaphysical problem discussed here.…”

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics

“…And indeed this seems to dovetail with some bits of the literature on Humeanism, for example, Lange [2013], Miller [2015], and Bhogal [2017]. Shumener [2017] clearly distinguishes between the metaphysical and semantic senses of determination at play for the Humean, but she also provides a powerful challenge to the idea that the circularity charge often leveled against Humeans could be resolved by appeal to that distinction. )…”

“…See, e.g., Lange (2013), Miller (2015), Bhogal (2017). Shumener (2017) clearly distinguishes between the metaphysical and semantic senses of determination at play for the humean, but also provides a powerful challenge to the idea that the circularity charge often leveled against humeans could be resolved by appeal to that distinction.) If you're skeptical about this claim when it comes to truth-determination, consider the following, which I think is a clear case in which we should distinguish between truth-determination and mground:…”

Breaking the explanatory circle

“…Accusations of circularity have dogged Humeans at least since Dretske (1977b); most recently these have been advanced by Lange (2013Lange ( , 2016, as well as Maudlin (2007: 172) and Bird (2007). Meanwhile Shumener (2019) and Roski (2018) have offered strengthened versions of this accusation. The circularity argument typically goes like this: (P1) the fact that L is a Humean law is explained by the totality of particular facts.…”