Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance

Pejovich, Svetozar; Colombatto, Enrico

doi:10.4337/9781848442900

Cited by 24 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Hence, effective property rights are crucial determinants of economic performance (Alston, 2008;North, 1990;Opper, 2008). Accordingly, the establishment and maintenance of property rights may be considered as the most important pillar of a free market economy (Pejovich, 2008). Our data on this aspect of institutional performance derive from answers to the question (Q1): To what degree do you agree with this statement?…”

Section: Data and Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Efendić¹,

Pugh

Adnett

2011

Economics of Transition

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This article uses survey data to investigate the relationship between citizens' confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We find an endogenous substituting relationship and that the different institutional structures currently existing in the two entities in BiH are significantly linked to respondents' confidence in formal and reliance on informal institutions. In addition, perceptions of higher indirect costs of institutions and a lack of their improvement are associated with a lower confidence in formal and a greater reliance on informal institutions; the minority ethnic groups in each region are less confident in formal and rely more on informal institutions compared to the

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Section: Data and Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Efendić¹,

Pugh

Adnett

2011

Economics of Transition

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“…Despite the challenges, in recent years, many efforts have been made, and there is a growing interest in this subject. Theoretically, informal institution has to do with social cohesion, and conceptually, the definition ranges from cultural norms, social capital, social trust and moral values (North, 1990; Pejovich and Colombatto, 2010). It is through trust collective action problems are resolved through facilitating cooperation (Gardner et al , 1990; Ostrom, 2014; Williamson, 2009; Williamson and Kerekes, 2011).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Asian growth paradox through interaction between informal and formal institutions

Chung¹,

Kim

2021

AEDS

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PurposeMuch of existing research has attempted to explain Asian Growth Paradox through formal institution – role of the government or rule of law. Therefore, this paper attempts to empirically explain the paradox with informal institution including interaction between informal and formal institutions. Two interrelated research questions summarize this research. First, how can we capture the relationship between informal and formal institutions? Then, how is that relationship different for Asian Paradox states vs non-paradox states?Design/methodology/approachTo capture the relationship between informal and formal institutions, we use Helmke and Levitsky (2004)'s framework to categorize the interaction as complementing, competing, substituting and accommodating. We perform cross-sectional regression analysis for more than 130 countries.FindingsWe find that the developed, developing and the Asian Paradox states display different patterns of interaction between informal and formal institutions. However, we also find that the interaction effect has a limited value explaining growth for most of these countries, suggesting that Helmke and Levitsky (2004)'s framework has limitations. Finally, we challenge the notion of Asian Paradox states, as countries outside of Asia also qualify as the Paradox states.Originality/valueNot much empirical effort has examined how different relationships between informal and formal institutions can explain growth internationally across countries. We show that different institutional patterns explain growth across the Paradox states and non-Paradox states.

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“…Commentators often observe that, while the globalisation of the market economy has for instance entailed the development of new roles for financial markets and a new distribution of production and labour, international law remains structured around the sovereignty of states and their voluntarism to adopt, ratify and abide to international legal instruments. In the absence of a global ruling power, global regulatory dynamics are straying away from state-centred positive law towards new forms of regulations that include, among others, informal rules (Pauwelyn, 2012; Pejovich and Colombatto, 2008), co-regulatory models (Kadelbach and Günther, 2011; Calliess and Zumbansen, 2010; Berns et al , 2007), unidentified normative objects (Frydman, 2014b, p. 183) and administrative-alike regulatory devices (Kingsbury et al , 2005). Indicators are often described as part of these new forms of regulation (Frydman and Twining, 2015, p. 4; Davis et al , 2015, p. 2).…”

Section: Incentives As Stimulus For Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supping with the Devil? Indicators and the rise of managerial rationality in law

Amariles

2017

International Journal of Law in Context

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Managerial devices are rapidly developing as a means for driving the legal performance of organisations, including those of states and corporations. This paper explores the managerial rationality underpinning global legal indicators, and the constraints they convey on institutional behaviour. In particular, it argues that indicators are better understood as part of a system of management control and distributed governance, which is steadily eroding state-centred forms of authority, including state law. In this context, legitimacy and reactivity are contingent to their cycle of production and implementation, which is fourfold: data-collecting, benchmarking, auditing and allocating incentives. Each process is meant to generate respectively subjectification, self-knowledge by comparison, accountability and stimulus for action. Indicators with higher degrees of legitimacy become entrenched in institutional practices and legal decision-making processes. The paper concludes that regulatory spaces where indicators unfold need critical and political scrutiny to expose their pernicious effects, undesirable uses and inevitable misuses.

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Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Explaining Asian growth paradox through interaction between informal and formal institutions

Supping with the Devil? Indicators and the rise of managerial rationality in law

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