Law and the Possibilities for a Just Urban Political Economy

Abstract

Distributive justice in cities has suffered from the inability of local governments to control productive resources, especially land. Contrary to Paul Peterson's argument, cities are not acting on their “corporate interests” when they favor development because, historically, the legal status of cities has diminished their corporate powers in favor of private property rights. Recent court cases reflect judicial ambivalence about local control of land. While the Supreme Court has criticized far‐reaching land regulations, many innovative policies aimed at increasing commercial landowners' obligations to the community have gained doctrinal approval. Local governments may be able to exploit these legal openings to challenge the immutable unitary conception of property that makes cities dependent on private investment decisions. In short, local officials need to argue in court for public property rights. Ultimately, the political process within cities will determine whether localities govern land innovatively and justly, but more just urban political economies are not possible without judicial support.

Promoting Low Income Housing through Innovations in Land Use Regulations

“…There have been various explanations for this type of progressive development policy, from the effective demand-making of urban constituencies (Goetz, 1990;Walton, 1990) to the administrative initiative (Bellone, 1988) or ideological orientation (Clarke, 1987), or electoral concerns of local officials (Judd & Ready, 1986), the role of comprehensive planning (Clavel, 1986), the influence of higher levels of government (Turner, 1990;Clarke, 1984), and the accommodation ofjudicial doctrines (Garber, 1990;Kirchheimer, 1990).…”

“…Rent control is the regulatory limiting of rents, rent increases, and evictions. Controls are usually applied with flexibility regarding the landlord's rate of return and the application of controls to vacant or newly constructed units (Gilderbloom & I Low Income Housing and Land Use Regulations I 345 Applebaum, 1988). The operation of such programs generally is overseen by rent control boards with both real estate and tenant interests represented.…”

“…Opponents of the mechanism charge it with contributing to disinvestment and abandonment, deflating real estate markets, discouraging new construction, and even contributing to homelessness (Tucker, 1990;Sternlieb, 1972). Defenders dispute each of those claims and argue that rent control helps prevent rent gouging in heated markets and protects against poor maintenance and unjust evictions (Bartelt & Lawson, 1982;Gilderbloom & Applebaum, 1988).…”

Shaming the Inside Game

“…In fact, liberal ideology blinds expansionists from even considering the plausibility of any competing explanation. This affliction results because many of the alternative (or progressive) development strategies that might replace the corporate-centered approach question the efficiency of and seek to restructure the current division of labor between the market and the state in American corporate capitalism (see Alperovitz 2005;Clavel 1986;Rast 1999;Gunn and Gunn 1991;Garber 1990;Imbroscio 1997).…”

Nontraditional Public Enterprise as Local Economic Development Policy

“…Paradoxically, in an era marked by a preoccupation with the privatization of public services, many local govemments pursuing economic development increasingly have engaged in "public enterprise," i.e., local-level public ownership of economic enterprises and of other profitmaking productive assets. This phenomenon is especially interesting and notable because, whereas local govemments traditionally have owned airports, convention centers, sport stadia, hospitals, and public utilities (Garber, 1990), the new wave of activity tends to involve "nontraditional" local public enterprises such as hotels, retail establishments, manufacturing facilities, and sports teams.…”