Latin American Party Systems

Abstract

Political parties provide a crucial link between voters and politicians. This link takes a variety of forms in democratic regimes, from the organization of political machines built around clientelistic networks to the establishment of sophisticated programmatic parties. Latin American Party Systems provides a novel theoretical argument to account for differences in the degree to which political party systems in the region were programmatically structured at the end of the twentieth century. Based on a diverse array of indicators and surveys of party legislators and public opinion, the book argues that learning and adaptation through fundamental policy innovations are the main mechanisms by which politicians build programmatic parties. Marshalling extensive evidence, the book's analysis shows the limits of alternative explanations and substantiates a sanguine view of programmatic competition, nevertheless recognizing that this form of party system organization is far from ubiquitous and enduring in Latin America.

The Ideational Approach to Populism

“…Third, by comparing Argentina, Chile, and Peru we have the opportunity of examining three countries that have experienced quite different trajectories, particularly in terms of the formation and institutionalization of political parties across the twentieth century. This is an important feature for our analysis because various scholars have argued that a strong party system seriously affects the likelihood of populism (e.g., Kitschelt et al 2010;Levitsky and Loxton 2013;Mainwaring and Scully 1995).…”

“…Several aspects are worth emphasizing. To begin with, although Chile is normally seen as a paradigmatic example of a country with a strong party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995;Kitschelt et al 2010), populism has not been absent. There are five clear moments in which presidents employed the populist Much the same could be said for Ibáñez, who is labeled a populist in multiple accounts (Drake 1999;Fernández Abara 2007).…”

Determinants of social spending in Latin America during and after the Washington consensus: a dynamic panel error-correction model analysis

“…Kitschelt and Herbert (2001) maintain that centre and right-wing parties are more reluctant to cut benefits or to impose fiscal austerity in times of economic recession. 6 Roberts (2002) and Kitschelt et al (2010) argue that left-wing parties do not have a significant influence on social policy, due to their low levels of institutionalization and the lack of substantive differences between left and right party labels, when compared to those in the developed countries (Niedzwiecki and Sara 2015). Hicks and EspingAndersen (2003) present a comparative analysis of the role of left-and right-wing parties in the development of the welfare state.…”

Ernesto Calvo (2014). Legislator Success in Fragmented Congresses in Argentina. Plurality Cartels, Minority Presidents, and Lawmaking

“…Calvo retoma a García Montero (2009) y a Kitschelt et al (2010) para destacar que los votantes latinoamericanos suelen elegir presidentes minoritarios y congresos fragmentados/plurales (plurality-led congress). Una segunda diferencia importante consiste en los poderes legislativos de los presidentes que en la región poseen la facultad de la iniciativa legislativa contando con la capacidad de instalar en nombre propio su agenda en el Congreso.…”