Las potencias subregionales en el sistema internacional de posguerra fría: ¿nuevos actores en la política internacional?

Abstract

Recibido: 2 de noviembre de 2015 / Aceptado: 7 de marzo de 2016 Resumen. En trabajos anteriores, hemos avanzado en la identificación y diferenciación de tres categorías de potencias: potencias mundiales, potencias medias y potencias regionales. Pero, más allá de las potencias mundiales y las potencias medias que se encuentran en el centro del sistema-mundial, y las potencias regionales que se ubican en la semiperiferia, ¿es posible hablar de potencias que se encuentren en la periferia? Como se trata de Estados periféricos, ¿pueden ser calificados como "potencias"? ¿En qué radicaría su relevancia y envergadura? Dichas "potencias" ¿pueden ser agrupadas en una nueva categoría? De ser así, ¿qué características compartirían? El objetivo de este documento es proponer una nueva categoría de potencias en el sistema internacional: las potencias subregionales. Palabras clave: potencias subregionales; estructura internacional; poder nacional/internacional; Índice de Poder Mundial (IPM); Estados periféricos ascendentes.[en] Subregional Powers in the International System of the Post-Cold War: New Actors in International Politics?Abstract. In previous work, we have advanced towards the identification and differentiation of three categories of powers: world powers, middle powers and regional powers. But beyond the world powers and middle powers that are in the core of the world-system, and regional powers that are located in the semi-periphery, is it possible to speak of powers that are in the periphery? In terms of peripheral States, can they be classified as "powers"? What is its relevance and scope? Such "powers", can be grouped into a new category? If so, what features would they share? The aim of this document is to propose and to debate a new category of powers in the international system: the subregional powers.

Neopresidentialism and the hierarchy of power in Latin American Integration

“…Afterwards is, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. These three countries occupy a high structural position, but lower than the previous one: Chile can be characterized as a secondary regional State (Wehner, 2015;, that is to say, a State structurally placed in the lower part of the semi-periphery without the material capacities to compete with the regional powers; while Colombia and Venezuela are two subregional powers (Morales, Rocha, & Durán, 2016;Tzili, 2017;Iñiguez-Torres, 2017). These three countries are key players in the definition, construction, and governance of South America.…”

Nueva década perdida en América Latina

“…Colombia ha sido visto como un país cercano a la semiperiferia (Arrighi & Drangel, 1986) o, más ampliamente, como un país periférico fuerte (Nemeth & Smith, 1985;Mahutga & Smith, 2011;Babones & Zhang, 2008). Efectivamente, Colombia es el país más poderoso de la Comunidad Andina y el quinto de América Latina, motivo por el cual comienza a ser caracterizado como una potencia regional secundaria en definición (Ardila, 2012;2022) o potencia subregional (Morales et al, 2016;Souza, 2021). Después de las dificultades económicas y sociales sufridas en los 80 a causa de las guerrillas y el narcotráfico, los gobiernos de César Gaviria (1990-1994) y Ernesto Samper (1994-1998 estabilizaron el país y crearon las condiciones para un acelerado desarrollo del poder nacional colombiano; más tarde, debido a las consecuencias de la crisis económica de finales de los 90, Colombia retrocedió en sus capacidades nacionales hasta niveles de 1994; y, finalmente, arrancó con una nueva fase de ascenso en la geoestructura internacional de poder que alcanzó su punto más alto al término del primer mandato de Juan Manuel Santos (2010Santos ( -2018.…”

The Semiperipheral States in the Twenty-first Century: Measuring the Structural Position of Regional Powers and Secondary Regional States

“…For a differentiation of the semiperiphery, we will proceed methodologically to examine the national power of semiperipheral states and the configuration of their capacities. In this sense, national power is understood here as the relative and relational potentiality that conditions the structural position, capacity projection and behaviour of a state in the international system (Morales, Rocha, & Durán, 2016;Rocha & Morales, 2018). The most relevant of their perspective on national power is that, in addition to considering it as a three-dimensional phenomenonwhich advances the two-dimensional type hard/soft power perspective-it is sustained on the concept of national capacities, which are also organized in three dimensions and based on indicators that are clearly measurable.…”

“…The important economic-military power of these countries is due to the fact that their territories are very extensive (more than one million square kilometres, with the exception of Turkey and Poland), all have an annual GNI over half a trillion dollars (with the exception of South Africa), they have powerful armies with resources superior to US$10 billion (except Mexico, Argentina and South Africa), their commercial exchanges with the world are relevant, because in most cases are superior, to US$400 billion, their financial reserves have been placed in the last years over the US$100 billion (except South Africa and Argentina) and their investments in science and technology are notable, since year after year they designate more than US$2 billion in R&D. In this latter item, Indonesia stands out, because it invests less than a billion, which confirms its situation of lag and relative development, as evidenced by its semi-material capabilities. For this reason, Indonesia is effectively a power, but belongs to a different category: the subregional powers (Iñiguez-Torres, 2017;Morales, 2018;Morales et al, 2016;Tzili, 2017).…”