Language Based Secure Communication

Bugliesi, Michele; Focardi, Riccardo

doi:10.1109/csf.2008.17

Cited by 15 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The present paper continues on the line of work initiated in [7,6], by introducing a type system to provide static security guarantees for the high-level abstractions for distributed messaging proposed in those papers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The label shows the view of the output available to an observer, while the cached copy holds both the internal and the external view of the payload. If the output is plain, the two views coincide; if it is secret, the external view is a tupleñ of fresh names: as discussed in [7], this corresponds to assume an implementation of a secret output in terms of randomized encryption. The (Open) rules implement the scope extrusion mechanisms: notice that channel names are always extruded in an output.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following an increasingly popular approach in the specification of distributed systems, in [7,6] the first author and Focardi isolated a core set of security abstractions for programming distributed protocols, and showed them effective both for high-level protocol design and for security analysis in adversarial settings. In the present paper, we further investigate the effectiveness of that approach by developing a typed version of the abstractions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Macedonio

2010

Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security

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Abstract. We introduce a calculus with mobile names, distributed principals and primitives for secure remote communication, without any reference to explicit cryptography. The calculus is equipped with a system of types and effects providing static guarantees of secrecy and authenticity in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. The novelty with respect to existing type systems for security is in the structure of our secrecy and authenticity types, which are inspired by the formulas of BAN Logic, and retain much of the simplicity and intuitive reading of such formulas. Drawing on these types, the type system makes it possible to characterize authenticity directly as a property of the data exchanged during a protocol rather than indirectly by extracting and interpreting the effects the protocol has on that data.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Macedonio

2010

Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security

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“…To help reasoning about the security properties, the specification of security protocols with high-level programming abstractions, suited for security analysis and automated verification, has been advocated by the formal methods for security research community [4], [5]. This was also one of the reasons for developing tools for the verification of security protocols in the symbolic model [6], [7], [8], and for the automatic generation of security protocols implementations [9], [10], [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An IDE for the Design, Verification and Implementation of Security Protocols

Garcia¹,

Modesti

2017

2017 IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)

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Abstract-Security protocols are critical components for the construction of secure and dependable distributed applications, but their implementation is challenging and error prone. Therefore, tools for formal modelling and analysis of security protocols can be potentially very useful to support software engineers. However, despite such tools having been available for a long time, their adoption outside the research community has been very limited. In fact, most practitioners find such applications too complex and hardly usable for their daily work. In this paper, we present an Integrated Development Environment for the design, verification and implementation of security protocols, aimed at lowering the adoption barrier of formal methods tools for security. In the spirit of Model Driven Development, the environment supports the user in the specification of the model using the simple and intuitive language AnB (and its extension AnBx). Moreover, it provides a push-button solution for the formal verification of the abstract and concrete models, and for the automatic generation of Java implementation. This Eclipse-based IDE leverages on existing languages and tools for the modelling and verification of security protocols, such as the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator, the model checker OFMC and the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif.

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“…Dilloway and Lowe present a hierarchy of secure channels and discuss their relative strengths [17]. Bugliesi and Focardi devise secure channel abstractions in a process algebraic setting and reason about the relative power of a low-level adversary [18]. Armando et al model different channel types using set-rewriting and linear temporal logic [19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security protocol specification and verification with AnBx

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Mödersheim

et al. 2016

Journal of Information Security and Applications

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Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms. To tame this complexity, we propose AnBx , a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission. AnBx extends existing proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate forwarding agents. We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model and a possible cryptographic implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide, thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET.

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Language Based Secure Communication

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 15 publications

References 19 publications

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

An IDE for the Design, Verification and Implementation of Security Protocols

Security protocol specification and verification with AnBx

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