Lack of multiplicative transitivity in person trade‐off responses

Schwarzinger, Michaël; Lanoé, Jean-Louis; Nord, Erik; Durand‐Zaleski, Isabelle

doi:10.1002/hec.808

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…One criticism of the PTO technique used in this study is that some subjects may treat large numbers metaphorically, not literally (e.g 1,000 means 'many'; 10,000 means 'very many') [29]. Implausibly large values of n in the calculation of utility (100/n) will result in implausibly low utility scores.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Severity as an independent determinant of the social value of a health service

et al. 2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper has two objectives, first to review the relevant literature concerning the social importance of severity of pre-treatment condition, and second to present the results of a new analysis of the relationship between social value, individual assessment of health improvement and the severity of illness. The present study differs methodologically from others reported in the literature. The underlying hypothesis is that members of the public have an aversion to patients being in a severe health state irrespective of the reason for their being there, and that this aversion will affect the social valuation of a health program after taking account of the magnitude of the health improvement. This effect will be observable in a program which (compared to another) takes a person out of a severe health state--the usual case discussed in the literature--or in a program which (compared to another) leaves a person in a severe health state. The present study tests this second implication of the hypothesis. We present data consistent with the view that after taking account of health improvement, health programs are preferred which do not leave people in severe health states. Alternative explanations are considered and particularly the possibility that data reflect a social preference for individuals achieving their health potential. Both explanations imply the need to reconsider the rules for prioritizing programs. In this analysis, Person Trade-Off (PTO) scores are used to measure social preferences ('value' or 'social utility') and Time Trade-Off (TTO) scores are used to measure individual assessments of health improvement and initial severity. Econometric results suggest that severity is highly significant and may more than double the index of social value of a health service.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Severity as an independent determinant of the social value of a health service

et al. 2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Within health economics, relatively little attention has been paid to transitivity in the context of choice experiments, an exception is [8], despite attention devoted to it in the context of other preference elicitation techniques, see for example, [18,19]. More attention has been paid to the completeness axiom although much of this work has focused on preferences in general [20][21][22][23][24], rather than those specifically derived via DCEs [25,26].…”

Section: Consumer Theory Axioms and Rationality Tests Used In Dcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deleting ‘irrational’ responses from discrete choice experiments: a case of investigating or imposing preferences?

Lancsar¹,

Louviere²

2006

Health Economics

301

206

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Investigation of the 'rationality' of responses to discrete choice experiments (DCEs) has been a theme of research in health economics. Responses have been deleted from DCEs where they have been deemed by researchers to (a) be 'irrational', defined by such studies as failing tests for non-satiation, or (b) represent lexicographic preferences. This paper outlines a number of reasons why deleting responses from DCEs may be inappropriate after first reviewing the theory underpinning rationality, highlighting that the importance placed on rationality depends on the approach to consumer theory to which one ascribes. The aim of this paper is not to suggest that all preferences elicited via DCEs are rational. Instead, it is to suggest a number of reasons why it may not be the case that all preferences labelled as 'irrational' are indeed so. Hence, deleting responses may result in the removal of valid preferences; induce sample selection bias; and reduce the statistical efficiency and power of the estimated choice models. Further, evidence suggests random utility theory may be able to cope with such preferences. Finally, we discuss a number of implications for the design, implementation and interpretation of DCEs and recommend caution regarding the deletion of preferences from stated preference experiments.

show abstract

“…31,32 Published critiques of the PTO method employed in the GBD are detailed in the literature. [31][32][33][34][35] The 22 indicator conditions reflected various manifestations of morbidity (e.g., physical, neuro-psychiatric, pain, sexual/reproductive, and social). The indicator conditions were grouped into seven bands, with ranges of severity weights for each band (Table 2).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of authors have addressed the ethical implications of these trade-offs, including the question of whether society really puts a lower value on extending the life of people with disabilities than people in "perfect health." 1,30,31,[34][35][36][37][38] In the GBD 1990 study, disability weights for selected conditions and sequelae were adjusted according to whether a person was assumed to have received medical treatment and whether the treatment was believed to have led to remission. For example, the disability weight was 0.583 for patients with untreated bipolar disorder and 0.383 for treated bipolar patients who remained depressed.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%