2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.09.010
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Labour taxes and unemployment evidence from a panel unobserved component model

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Cited by 16 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Accordingly, second-round effects are more likely to occur. Berger and Everaert (2007) show that only in the latter group of countries does a labour tax increase result in increased unemployment, which indicates that exactly those countries succeed in shifting the burden of the tax increase to the producers, which is supported by the results found in Daveri and Tabellini (1997). The fact that all countries for which we find a significant reaction of nominal wages belong to this group, is certainly not at odds with this theory.…”
Section: Second-round Effects As a Source Of Cross-country Differencessupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Accordingly, second-round effects are more likely to occur. Berger and Everaert (2007) show that only in the latter group of countries does a labour tax increase result in increased unemployment, which indicates that exactly those countries succeed in shifting the burden of the tax increase to the producers, which is supported by the results found in Daveri and Tabellini (1997). The fact that all countries for which we find a significant reaction of nominal wages belong to this group, is certainly not at odds with this theory.…”
Section: Second-round Effects As a Source Of Cross-country Differencessupporting
confidence: 78%
“…The unobserved components models have been used in different economic applications, for estimating the natural level of the labor supply (Bull and Frydman [1983]), for modeling credibility of the monetary authority (Weber [1991]), for analyzing the GDP (Luginbuhl and Vos [1999], Morley et al [2003]), the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (Kleijn and van Dijk [2001]), consumption (Elwood [1998]), unemployment (Chung and Harvey [2000], Berger and Everaert [2009]), for modeling tax revenues (Koopman and Ooms [2003]), cycles (Chambers and McGarry [2002]) and for analyzing financial series (Cowan and Joutz [2006]), among others.…”
Section: Methodologies Of Estimation Of the Nirmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many of the studies in this second group pay no attention to labor or product market rigidities (Dhont and Heylen 2008, 2009, Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson 2008, Olovsson 2009, Prescott 2004, Rogerson 2007). Others (e.g., Daveri and Tabellini 2000, Berger and Everaert 2010) emphasize that the effects of tax changes may depend on labor market institutions. Our aim in this paper is to test the explanatory power of both views econometrically in a panel of OECD countries in 1970–2007.…”
Section: Employment Rate In Hours In Percent 2003–07mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other authors have applied this idea to the effect of labor tax changes. Building on Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Berger and Everaert (2010) show that the (un)employment effects of labor taxes are smaller (or even nonexistent) in highly decentralized and highly centralized/coordinated wage bargaining regimes. The U.S. and the UK represent the first regime, the Nordic countries are often taken as examples of the second regime.…”
Section: Institutions Fiscal Policy and Employment: Theoretical mentioning
confidence: 99%