2018
DOI: 10.1017/s1474745618000204
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Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements: Reflections on the European Commission's Reform Agenda

Abstract: Labour standards provisions within the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are presented as a key element of the EU's commitment to a ‘value-based trade agenda’. But criticism of TSD chapters has led the European Commission to commit to improving their implementation and enforcement, creating a critical juncture in the evolution of the EU's trade–labour linkage. This contribution synthesizes findings from academic studies that have examined the effectiveness of l… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(26 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…These requirements often address the state level, such as to undertake legal and institutional changes or to strengthen trade union rights (Aissi et al 2017). The U.S. model of market-based coercion in foreign trade agreements is described as "conditional" and links compliance with a desired behavior to trade privilege (Harrison et al 2019). In contrast, the approach typically taken by the EU is described as "promotional" and provides a framework for dialogue and cooperation rather than linking compliance to incentives (Harrison et al 2019).…”
Section: Binding Public Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These requirements often address the state level, such as to undertake legal and institutional changes or to strengthen trade union rights (Aissi et al 2017). The U.S. model of market-based coercion in foreign trade agreements is described as "conditional" and links compliance with a desired behavior to trade privilege (Harrison et al 2019). In contrast, the approach typically taken by the EU is described as "promotional" and provides a framework for dialogue and cooperation rather than linking compliance to incentives (Harrison et al 2019).…”
Section: Binding Public Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The enforceability of the labour obligations via a formal dispute settlement mechanism is one of the most distinct characteristics of the US PTAs, described as a 'conditional approach' to labour enforcement, representing a major departure from the EU's 'promotional approach' to the protection of labour rights, mainly focused on building mechanisms of state-to-state cooperation. 48 In addition, the practice of requiring additional conditions of labour protection during the negotiating phase of its PTAs as a condition for the US ratification of the trade agreement has been developed in the TPP. 49 This additional dimension of enforcement has been also included in the USMCA, imposing a pre-ratification conditionality and a post-ratification enforcement to implement specific domestic reform of labour protection in Mexico in different Annexes.…”
Section: Enforcement Under the Usmca And Its Innovative Dimensionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After the US withdrew from the TPP, these countries refused to include these bilateral plans in the new CPTTP, as they were no longer under the US diplomatic pressure to proceed with their domestic labour law reforms. 75 Harrison, Barbu, Campling, Ebert, Martens, Marx, Orbie, Richardson,, and Smith (2019) 'Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements', 649. According to Article 31-A.15 'Definitions', a Covered Facility is quite a broad concept, as it is intended as a 'facility in the territory of a Party that: (i) produces a good or supplies a service traded between the Parties; or (ii) produces a good or supplies a service that competes in the territory of a Party with a good or a service of the other Party, and is a facility in a Priority Sector'.…”
Section: Pre-ratification Conditionality In the Usmca Of Mexico's Specific Commitments And Their Enforcementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mais la Commission envisage qu'à l'avenir, de tels organes institués dans les futurs accords négociés par l'Union soient habilités à intervenir de façon plus transversale dans la mise en oeuvre de l'entièreté de ces accords (European Commission, 2018:6). Cette perspective n'est peut-être pas souhaitable, en éloignant l'expertise des acteurs syndicaux des problématiques se rattachant principalement au travail (Harrison et al, 2018). Les personnes siégeant d'ailleurs au sein de ces instances, contraintes en pratique de démultiplier leur présence en leur sein, semblent d'ailleurs douter de l'intérêt de cette machinerie administrative très chronophage mise en place par la Commission 14 .…”
Section: Ii1 Des Cadres Conventionnels Concurrents Du Dialogue Sociunclassified