Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule

Kartal, Melis

doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9408-x

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Levine and Palfrey () conduct an experiment with a very similar design to ours but only look at winner‐take‐all elections. Recent experimental findings related to ours can also be found in Kartal (). That experiment implements a different, piecewise linear, version of proportional representation and the design mainly addresses issues of representation and efficiency.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 81%

Turnout and Power Sharing

Herrera

Morelli

Palfrey

2014

The Economic Journal

113

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We compare turnout under proportional power‐sharing electoral systems and winner‐take‐all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voter preferences. If the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner‐take‐all system; the result is reversed when there is a clear underdog. We report findings from a laboratory experiment that was designed and conducted to explore this theoretical hypothesis and several other secondary hypotheses that are also implied by the theoretical model. The results are broadly supportive of the theoretical predictions on comparative turnout, the partial underdog compensation effect and the competition effect.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 81%

Turnout and Power Sharing

Herrera

Morelli

Palfrey

2014

The Economic Journal

113

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“…The properties of MR can and do fail when there is asymmetry. For example, PR generates strictly higher turnout than MR in large elections if p is sufficiently small and f (0) > 0 (see the companion article, Kartal, ) . The intuition for this is as follows.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout

Kartal

2014

Econ J

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I investigate the welfare properties of a broad class of electoral systems with endogenous turnout. I find that the welfare ranking of electoral systems depends on the composition of the electorate. If citizens have identical voting costs, then all electoral systems that satisfy certain regularity properties generate the same level of welfare. If voting costs are heterogeneous, and the two parties are (almost) equally popular, then majority rule (MR) generates the highest welfare among these systems. I also analyse a model with heterogeneous and group‐specific costs. I show that, under certain conditions, proportional representation dominates MR.

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“…The statistical significance is assessed using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with one observation per subject per category. 29 In what follows, we call elections that are predicted not to be close, i.e., predicted to have a winner's lead of two or more votes, landslide elections. 30 In Figure 1, we report only events that occurred at least 10 times over all experimental elections.…”

Section: Duffy and Tavits 2008 And Levine And Palfrey 2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs

Agranov¹,

Goeree²,

Romero

et al. 2017

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm -that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.JEL classification: C92, D02, D72

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Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule

Cited by 22 publications

References 31 publications

Turnout and Power Sharing

Turnout and Power Sharing

A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout

What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs

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