Labor's men: A collective biography of union officialdom during the new deal years

Licht, Walter; Barron, Hal S.

doi:10.1080/00236567808584511

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Many labor scholars have highlighted this important relationship as a barrier to rank-and-file participation in union reform movements: mere membership apathy in these cases is not the main issue (Barbash 1970;Buhle 1999;Cohen 2006;Kirshbaum 1940;Licht and Barron 1978;Moody 1988Moody , 2007Peck 1963;Seidman 1938;Van Tine 1973). For instance, in his chronicle of Teamsters for a Democratic Union, La Botz (1990) quoted a rank-and-file reformer who explained his inability to develop a broader base of membership participation in the movement for democracy.…”

Section: Labor Studies Journalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Before Schonfeld was elected, the movement faced a number of staff barriers to success. These included the following: bringing in autonomous locals for voting purposes only, which allowed the administration to ensure votes; electoral fraud; disciplining dissident members through union trials; and blacklisting dissidents from work through the hiring hall, many of the same processes that have been identified in the literature (Barbash 1970;Buhle 1999;Cohen 2006;Foster 1927;Glaberman 2002;Kirshbaum 1940;La Botz 1990;Licht and Barron 1978;Moody 1988Moody , 2007Peck 1963;Seidman 1938;Van Tine 1973).…”

Section: Context I: 1947 To 1967 the Corrupt Hiring Hallmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Why Should the Business Agents Be Bigger Than the Organization?”

McCarthy

2009

Labor Studies Journal

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Union democracy has tended to result in prolabor contracts in the American labor movement. However, many rank-and-file movements attempting to transform staff-led unions into democratic ones have experienced failure. The author examines some of the reasons why insurgent democracy movements are often unable to institute lasting democratic structures and militant reforms in the building trades, through an in-depth analysis of a failed rebellion in New York City’s painters’ union from 1947 to 1973. In contrast to recent literature that explains success and failure by emphasizing the traits of the general membership and the tactics of insurgent reformers, the author argues that fuller attention should be given to the union characteristics that generate staff power. In particular, the author shows that job allocation through the hiring hall is one means by which a corrupt staff can discipline an insurgent membership. The author also shows that when these conditions are undermined through contestation, staff-employer collusion can continue to make discipline through job allocation possible.

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Section: Labor Studies Journalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Context I: 1947 To 1967 the Corrupt Hiring Hallmentioning

confidence: 99%