La tarification optimale des télécommunications: Une présentation synthétique

Picard,

doi:10.2307/20075716

Annales d'Économie et de Statistique

1988

DOI: 10.2307/20075716

|View full text |Cite

La tarification optimale des télécommunications: Une présentation synthétique

Picard Picard¹

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2008

2017

Publication Types

Select...

Article2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Early works on the industrial organization of telecommunications can be found inPicard (1988) andLaffont and Tirole (1995).3 Other explanations for positive markups are provided in Armstrong and Wright (2009), Jullien et al (2013), and Hoernig et al (2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Baranès¹,

Poudou²,

Behringer³

2017

Annals of Economics and Statistics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper considers collusion between asymmetric networks in the telecommunications industry. Its primary purpose is to fill the gap between the literature on collusion between asymmetric firms and the literature on collusion in the telecommunications industry. Employing the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination we allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo locations, the subscribers to each network operator face an asymmetry parameter that directly impacts their demands and can capture asymmetries in demand elasticities, in demand size, or even both. The implications of these asymmetries for the possibility of sustaining collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes. RésuméCet article analyse la concurrence dans le secteur des télécommunications dans le cadre de réseaux asymétriques. A partir du modèle standard de différenciation horizontale sur les produits avec tarifs non linéaires et discrimination du prix des appels, nous envisageons une différenciation dans une deuxième dimension. Selon leur localisation, les consommateurs de chaque opérateur de réseau font faceà un paramètre d'asymétrie qui influe directement sur leurs demandes et peuvent capturer des différences d'élasticités ou de taille. Les implications de ces asymétries quantà la possibilité de maintenir la collusion sontétudiées sous des régimes alternatifs de tarification d'accès aux réseaux.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Baranès¹,

Poudou²,

Behringer³

2017

Annals of Economics and Statistics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Entre création de ressource et mesures réglementaires : quelle place pour la gestion de la demande en eau d’irrigation en Charente ?

et al. 2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

La tarification optimale des télécommunications: Une présentation synthétique

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Entre création de ressource et mesures réglementaires : quelle place pour la gestion de la demande en eau d’irrigation en Charente ?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About