La novità del nuovo realismo

Abstract

In the Italian public cultural discussion it has often been argued that philosophical realism is an obsolete and irrelevant conception and that no attention should be given to its new versions. In this article, it is argued that this thesis is flawed because the issue of realism is philosophically inescapable. This will be argued by discussing two examples that come from science. The first example concerns the concept of species, which is hotly debated today both in biology and in the philosophy of biology. What is relevant here is that none of the available definitions of species cover all the cases biologists would like to cover -so that

Discursive Research and Clinical Realities, or the Eye of the Beholder

“…Even in circles advocating a new approach to realism (Ferraris, ), though, some issues remain highly problematic. One of those is the role of science in defining reality: should I consider as real my immediate sensory evidence, or scientific results, filtered through a definite methodology, that may be very far from my senses (De Caro, )? The adequate description of an object is in terms of how I see and feel it, or its chemistry, or quantum mechanics?…”