L'invention du bénévolat : Genèse et institution de l'action bénévole au Québec Éric Gagnon , Andrée Fortin , Amélie-Elsa Ferland-Raymond et Annick Mercier Presses de l'Université Laval, Québec, 2013, 229 pages

Abstract

claims "politics in Africa is not exceptional" (xiii). Her main interest is institutional commitments to privatization. The main argument of the book is that the outcome of economic reforms depends not only on the kinds of institutional arrangements adopted by states during privatization but also on the nature of party system competition. The analysis draws on a number of datasets covering 27 countries that Pitcher has put together. These are followed by three case studies of the privatization process in Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa. Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies does not target the generalist reader, however, nor does it target political scientists who are not up to date with methodology-driven debates. The main conceptual tool she uses in her analysis is based on the work of Kenneth Shepsle, formal theory professor at Harvard University. As Pitcher puts it, "Kenneth Shepsle's distinction between a commitment that a government makes because it is motivated to do so at that particular moment (motivational commitment) and a commitment that a government adheres to because it is prevented from engaging in any other action without costly consequences (a commitment that is credible in the imperative sense) provides a useful conceptual solution to the problem [of knowing when a government makes a credible commitment to privatisation]" (63). Accordingly, Pitcher uses an index of motivationally credible commitments based on numerical values given to different institutional arrangements. The numbers assigned are based on her own evaluations which rely on formal institutional indicators like constitutions and laws (42). Pitcher acknowledges that this research design is not ideal, but she informs us that she "compensated for this weakness by comparing [her] evaluations with those of several research assistants" working for her (43). Not surprisingly, her analysis confirms what her datasets show: "This book has demonstrated that where African countries have adopted formal institutions designed to expand a private sector-driven economy, economic reform has been substantial" (248). But what is not addressed is how the formal institutions and constitutions can conceal informal power relations that deviate from democratic principles in general and reformist goals in specific. The workings of politics can be quite different from what the constitutions say. In addition to this problem in research design, there is little room for a new elected government by a left party undoing the privatization reforms the previous right-wing party governments had committed to (her argument about party competition allows for piecemeal change, however). And if indeed left and right makes little difference in the countries she examines, then the foundations of the argumentthat is, that one can build on party politics literature from the industrialized world to study economic reforms in Africa-is compromised. It is perhaps for this reason that the case study of South Africa is the strongest chapter in the book. Sou...