KVN: A TV Show Larger Than Television

Semenenko, Aleksei

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-76279-7_4

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Scholars have studied the game's video materials of 2003-2018 seasons and concluded that teams denigrated unfriendly countries as well as their politicians while Russia and its leaders were presented in a positive light, criticism of domestic issues was soft, and all local problems looked solvable (Barashkov 2018;Pimenova et al, 2018). Russian researchers who are now affiliated with the Western universities have labelled KVN as a "controlled game" (Garey, 2020: 2;Tagangaeva 2018: 16) and its content as "state-approved political satire" (Semenenko 2018(Semenenko , 2021. But they practically ignored 1986-1999 KVN period.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Humor in KVN (1986–1999)

2024

Media Education (Mediaobrazovanie)

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The article traces evolution of political humor in popular Russian television game KVN in 1986-1999. The online survey, which involved 100 KVN fans aged 41-65, helped to figure out what political sketches or gags are the most memorable and might reflect the problems of the period. The author analyzes the show's content taking into consideration the main political and economic events which took place in the USSR during Perestroika and later in the Russian Federation in the 1990s. Having studied KVN's archive video materials (1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999), a documentary series History of Russian humor (2012), academic works of Russian and Western scholars, and mass media publications on the game, the author noticed the change in humor modus during those years. Tough criticism of the Soviet system combined with hopes for positive changes in the late 1980s. The teams joked on domestic issues, corrupt politicians, disintegration, territorial losses, and admired the Western lifestyle in the 1990s. The game seemed to be above politics, but indirectly supported Boris Yeltsin during 1996 presidential campaign. KVN players were "homo sovieticus": they had common memories, background, and experience. The game worked as "soft power" uniting teams from the former USSR republics in one cultural territory.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Humor in KVN (1986–1999)

2024

Media Education (Mediaobrazovanie)

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“…Scholars analyzed it as a part of amateur movement, a factor of upbringing and socialization of the youth (Kovalyov, 2004;Manukyan, 2022;Ostromooukhova, 2011;Rubekina, 2015), characterized it as a phenomenon of national mass culture and an integrated part of Russian TV history (Buklans, 2010). Russian researchers, who moved to the West, criticized the game for being an instrument of the Soviet, later Russian, state-approved political satire (Semenenko, 2018(Semenenko, , 2021, "controlled game" (Garey, 2020: 2) but felt nostalgic for its hilarious, energetic buzzing. Critics assume that as young people play KVN the viewers should be their age, but they might be under a delusion.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

KVN: Students’ View on the Game

2023

Media Education (Mediaobrazovanie)

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KVN is the most long-lasting humor program on national TV. Review of the academic studies show that there are different approaches to assessing the role of KVN in agenda-setting and forming political opinions in Russia, but most scholars consider the youth to be the game's target audience. The research goal is to find out if KVN is popular with young people in the Russian Federation. The article summarizes the results of the online survey conducted in April-May 2023 during which 200 students from Linguistics University of Nizhny Novgorod and Lobachevski State University of Nizhny Novgorod (aged 19-25) answered the questions on their attitude to the game, regularity and the way they watch it. The young people named their favorite teams, comedians, and sketches. The results prove that though respondents are aware what KVN is, the show is of no interest to more than a half of them. Those, who watch the game, do it mostly via the Internet, prefer wordplay, situation, and abstract humor. Teams and comedians who played in seasons 2013-2016 are named as favorites, possibly because of their frequent appearance on TV and social media. Students would like to see changes in the game's format and content.

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“…Discomfort with the program's live format led to it being pre-recorded before finally being cancelled in 1972. 16 During glasnost, the program was revived and no longer limited to smuggling in political topics. This version of the series openly mocked the disjunct between the policies of perestroika and glasnost and much of the late communist political establishment.…”

Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Together they represent the bulk of television production in Russia today. 19 Their presence is both a means of scouting talent and keeping tight control over KVN. A significant percentage of the most famous and successful individuals in the Russian television industry began performing on KVN.…”

Section: P O S T -S O V I E T S a T I R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

Brassard

2022

VIEW Journal

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For a brief period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a degree of political freedom existed in Russia that allowed political satire to appear on television. Different oligarchs purchased important television channels and used them to push the Boris Yeltsin government to approve policies favorable to their business interests by polarizing public opinion against the government. The fractious nature of Russian media in the 1990s and the battles for influence between different oligarchs created an environment in which political satire existed openly in Russian culture, which had not been permitted during the nearly seventy years of communist rule. A particularly significant example of this was NTV's program Kukly (Puppets) (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002) based on the UK program Spitting Image, which featured puppet versions of prominent Russian politicians, and aired threehundred-sixty-three episodes. Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned as president of Russia on December 31, 1999, and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who has remained the central political figure in Russia since then. Putin's government almost immediately began to reign in media freedoms. By the end of 2002, all of Russia's major media properties were under the control of either a state-owned company or close allies of the Russian government. Unsurprisingly Kukly was taken off the air that year, and political satire disappeared from Russian mass culture. This paper will map out the development of Russian satire on television since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using prominent examples from unscripted standup comedy, evening variety shows and scripted dramas that are openly political and apparently apolitical, this paper argues the Russian television industry engages with and subverts the potential of various satirical genres resulting in the creation of cynical distance that potentially impedes the ability of satire to speak truth to power.

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KVN: A TV Show Larger Than Television

Cited by 3 publications

References 4 publications

Political Humor in KVN (1986–1999)

Political Humor in KVN (1986–1999)

KVN: Students’ View on the Game

Satire in Putin's Russia: Cynical Distance as a Tool of State Power

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