Kualitas Audit dan Manajemen Laba Berbasis Operasional

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of audit quality on real earnings management. Audit quality refers to the size of the audit office. Conceptual framework borrows from agency theory positing that earnings management reflects managerial opportunistic behavior to influence the contractual outcome imposed by stakeholders. The size of the auditors' office represents available resources within the firm that eventually enables the auditor to maintain independence and to invests in auditing techno logy that results in higher technical competence. The hypothesis predicts that auditor size negatively affects real earnings management. The sample consists of firms engaging in manufacturing operations listed in Bursa Efek Indonesia, which meet specific requirements. In contrast with a hypothesis, the analysis reveals that auditor size is positively related to real earnings management. the results hold after controlling for self-selection bias. The paper conjectures that deep-pocket insurance might dominate audit quality in that relationship. Several caveats are in place that require due care in interpreting the results.