Kosovo, Non-Violence and the Break-Up of Yugoslavia

Salla, Michael

doi:10.1177/0967010695026004008

Cited by 15 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Demographics were on the Albanians’ side, Rugova believed; so long as they could avoid provoking retaliation, the Albanians’ higher fertility rate and the Serbs’ continued emigration meant Kosovo would become almost purely Albanian, after which the international community would support its independence and Belgrade would acquiesce (Malcolm 1998, 347–348; Clark 2000, 69–71, 116). 48 A more militant Albanian leader, who requested to remain Anonymous (2000), concurs that Serbia had a “two‐pronged strategy” for Kosovo: “If there was a rise in militancy, Serbia wanted to fight a big preventive war… [but if not] Serbia was willing to accept total pacifism.” As analyst Michael Salla (1995, 432) noted during the pacifist phase: “The Albanians’ disciplined campaign of nonviolence has meant that there have been few cases of violent confrontation.” 49…”

Section: Kosovomentioning

confidence: 99%

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

Kuperman¹

2008

Int Studies Q

217

106

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This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or “Responsibility to Protect,” contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral‐hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard.

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Section: Kosovomentioning

confidence: 99%

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

Kuperman¹

2008

Int Studies Q

217

106

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“…Albanian, which had been used heavily in schools, was no longer authorized. The Albanians organized a parallel society in response to the suppression of Kosovo autonomy (Clark, 2000; Salla, 1995). The main focus was on providing education in Albanian, with teaching primarily taking place in the homes of teachers who had lost their jobs.…”

Section: The Kosovo Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joining the Kosovo Liberation Army: A continuist, process-based analysis

Duclos

2020

Violence: An International Journal

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Drawing on semi-directed interviews with ex-combatants from the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) and the archives of the international organization responsible for disarming and demobilizing the combatants, this article examines the process by which individuals joined the armed resistance movement in Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s. Based on a “ground-level” approach, we emphasize the incremental nature of this mobilization and challenge the widespread understanding that Albanians in Kosovo turned suddenly to armed resistance. We also challenge strategic-political accounts of the origins of the armed struggle, instead of highlighting the importance of chance events. From a relational perspective, we demonstrate the significance of the repression that those involved in armed violence had experienced, either personally or collectively. Individual decisions to join the armed conflict of 1998–1999 took place in a continuum, following on from earlier periods that had been marked by excessive state violence.

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“…34 Ibrahim Rugova, the elected 'President of the Republic of Kosova,' headed the struggle for non-violent reform in Kosovo. 35 The basic policy pursued by Rugova and his political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was threefold:…”

Section: Non-violence Force and Emancipationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention, Emanicipation and Kosovo

Booth

1999

Civil Wars

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Kosovo, Non-Violence and the Break-Up of Yugoslavia

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

Joining the Kosovo Liberation Army: A continuist, process-based analysis

Intervention, Emanicipation and Kosovo

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