Kooperativer Föderalismus und Politikverflechtung

Municipal Infrastructure Policies in the Federal Republic—In Between Growing Disparities and Losing Political Autonomy?

“…The political and academic debate about Germany's federalism is still strongly influenced by the theoretical joint-decision making approach ("Politikverflechtung") that Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel developed together in the mid-1970s on the basis of an analysis of different mixed financing programmes (Scharpf et al, 1976;Kropp, 2010;Benz, Detemple, & Heinz, 2016). In this context Politikverflechtung was defined as one of the available ways of satisfying the need for governance in decentralized decision making systems and thus reducing specific problem-generating tendencies (Scharpf et al, 1976, p. 21).…”

On a Successful Road to ‘More Federalism’ in Länder Politics? The Case of Smoking Bans after Germany's Federalism Reform

“…The gap between this claim and the very different capacity of the Länder in reality proved to be one of the decisive levers by which -in accordance with the unitary orientation of the public and supported by the Federal Constitutional Court -the nation-wide harmonisation of policies could be advanced. 10 Reunification in 1990 exemplifies the effect of the unitary political culture: instead of demands for greater political autonomy -meaning scope for individual, Land-specific solutions -the economic disadvantages and cultural differences have given rise to demands for more effective equalisation efforts. 11 Scharpf 12 therefore states that in Germany the necessary 'federalism culture' is missing, regional differences going beyond cultural issues were not seen as authentic expression of regional democracy but as obstacles to mobility and a denial of the constitutional claim for equal living conditions.…”

Allocating greenhouse gas emissions in the German federal system: Regional interests and federal climate governance

“…In addition to an institutional structure within which the two political levels are strongly interlinked in formulating and implementing policies, the structure of the party system leads to strong pressure to collaborate (Kropp, 2010). Since the political parties are relevant players at both the national and the Länder levels, party interests play a major role in addition to Länder interests in the Bundesrat.…”

“…Braun, 2000, 12f). This "jointdecision trap" (Scharpf, 2005) through the extensive institutional intertwining of the federal government and the Länder, as well as that of competition among the political parties, often necessitates considerable coordination efforts, forcing the political actors to seek the broadest possible consensus (Kropp, 2010). Especially in policy fields with considerable regional redistribution effects, or which have strong polarizing effects among the political parties, that results in considerable limits to political problem-solving capacity (Scharpf, 1976, p. 21) and poses risks of stalemates.…”

“…Kropp, 2010). First, such strategizing is particularly the case when the national and Länder governments are able to pass on the costs to third parties "not directly represented in their intergovernmental 'cartel'" (WachendorferSchmidt, 2000, p. 100).…”