With an analysis based on the performance of large-scale Nordic farms in Russia and Ukraine, this article deals with the frictions of the publicly listed, super large farming model. These farms began operations in 2006 and 2007 with much fanfare. Despite high initial expectations, however, these publicly traded companies (agroholdings) continue to disappoint investors, both with respect to agricultural performance and profitability (although with considerable variation among them). The main question to be addressed is: why have these investments not been successful? We will locate the reasons for this current lack of success in (1) the mixed role that finance has played in the development of these companies, and (2) an initial failure on the part of investors to appreciate the unique climatic and other local challenges presented by agriculture (compared to other economic endeavors). The contribution we seek to make is in critically examining and contextualizing claims concerning the degree to which super large corporate farms financed by stock market capital do indeed achieve superior agricultural performance. Based on an in-depth examination of four Nordic agroholdings, we arrive at an assessment of super large corporate farms that points to an incompatibility between land speculation and agricultural production and other contradictions and risks.