2002
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45760-7_10
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Known Plaintext Correlation Attack against RC5

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…They have managed to derive the last round key of up to 17 rounds by using chosen plaintext attack. While Shimoyama et al use a chosen plaintext attack, Miyaji et al [23] use a known plaintext attack, which breaks RC5-32/10 with 2 63.67 plaintexts at a probability of 90%.…”
Section: Rc5mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They have managed to derive the last round key of up to 17 rounds by using chosen plaintext attack. While Shimoyama et al use a chosen plaintext attack, Miyaji et al [23] use a known plaintext attack, which breaks RC5-32/10 with 2 63.67 plaintexts at a probability of 90%.…”
Section: Rc5mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They have managed to derive the last round key of up to 17 rounds by using a chosen plaintext attack. While Shimoyama et al use a chosen plaintext attack, Miyaji et al [189] use a known plaintext attack, which breaks RC5-32/10/16 with 2 63.67 plaintexts at a probability of 90%.…”
Section: Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%