Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms

Abstract

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward's interventionist-counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.

A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists)

“…Even so, at the higher level of the FEMs realized (and multiply realizable) by these computational media, one finds representations that share with non-sentential images and scale models several of the characteristics that distinguish them from sentential representations. I refer readers to Waskan (2003Waskan ( , 2006Waskan ( , 2008 for a fuller elaboration and defense of these claims. Here I will only provide a brief run-down of the characteristics that distinguish FEMs from sentential representations.…”

“…In other words, FEMs should, just like scale models, be classified as intrinsic representations, or intrinsic computational models (InCoMs). 11 In contrast, paradigmatic sentential representations of objects (e.g., production-system representations) are extrinsic representations in all high-level constraints must be built in antecedently and explicitly (see McCarthy and Hayes 1969;Waskan 2003Waskan , 2006Waskan , 2008.…”

“…For this reason, I have taken great pains to demonstrate that certain computer scientists and engineers have, by creating what are known as finite element models, inadvertently shown precisely this (Waskan 2003(Waskan , 2006(Waskan , 2008. What their work shows, in particular, is that because nonsentential images and models can be realized by (strict) computations, they too can-if not directly, then at least indirectly via computations-also be realized by neural machinations.…”

Mechanistic explanation at the limit

“…One might say that the simulation embodies explicit knowledge of the actual sequence but also tremendous amounts of tacit knowledge-that is, knowledge that is not encoded explicitly but can be generated on demand-of the conditions that might interfere with that process (Waskan 2008). In the same way, an off-line simulation might also embody tacit knowledge of the fact that (provided there is not some other event that would also make the bell ring) the ringing will not occur if the dropping of the ball is prevented or altered in various possible ways (e.g., its trajectory is diverted away from the ramp, it is thrown with great force into the hole, etc.).…”