Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases

Turri, John

doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch23

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 54 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Until recently, the philosophical debate has relied mainly on introspection and social observation to evaluate the behavioral claims, which is typical in Anglophone analytic philosophy (for reviews, see Turri , , ). But introspection and social observation are subject to well‐known limitations (e.g., Lieberman ; Milgram , pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Turri

Buckwalter

Rosé

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Researchers recently demonstrated a strong direct relationship between judgments about what a person knows (“knowledge judgments”) and judgments about how a person should act (“actionability judgments”). But it remains unknown whether actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments, or knowledge judgments cause actionability judgments. This paper uses causal modeling to help answer this question. Across two experiments, we found evidence that actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Turri

Buckwalter

Rosé

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The experimental evidence that has accumulated since the publication of Weinberg et al's study, however, has not supported the claim of substantial variation in epistemic intuitions (Turri 2016). There have been several failures to replicate the original finding of cultural variation in epistemic intuitions (Machery et al 2017;Seyedsayamdost 2015;Turri 2013), including a study using exactly the same experimental materials as the original Weinberg et al (2001) study but using a substantially larger sample size (Kim and Yuan 2015).…”

Section: Baz's Challenge To "The Prevailing Program"mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The wider pattern of responses to different types of Gettier cases reported in Blouw et al 2017, Starmans and Friedman (2012) and Turri et al (2015), which include responses to (theoretically) clear cases of knowledge and clear cases of non-knowledge (either cases of false belief, or true beliefs that lack justification) in fact poses a challenge to Baz's contention that the theorist's question (which, in Gettier cases is the question whether the protagonist knows that, e.g., Jill drives an American car) is not "clear" because it lacks a practical point. 11 If the theorist's question lacked a sense, as Baz claims then it should be surprising to see the consistent levels of knowledge-denial in certain kinds of Gettier cases that experimenters have found (around 80%-see Turri 2016, p. 341) as well as the consistent patterns of variation when epistemically significant features of the Gettier cases are varied (see the Appendix for details), and especially the much higher rates of knowledge attribution in theoretically clear cases of knowledge (79-90% in Starmans and Friedman 2012 and Turri et al 2015) than in theoretically clear cases of non-knowledge (8-14% in Friedman 2012 andTurri et al 2015). 12 (All of these experimental studies are described in greater detail in the Appendix.…”

Section: Baz's Challenge To "The Prevailing Program"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy

Hansen

2018

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language philosophy and grounded in experimental data, to certain forms of standard philosophical practice. The challenge is inspired by contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as practicing "ordinary language philosophy". Contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be divided into constructive and critical approaches. The critical approach to contemporary ordinary language philosophy has been forcefully developed by Avner Baz, who attempts to show that a substantial chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. I describe Baz's project and argue that while there is reason to be skeptical of its radical conclusion, it conveys an important truth about discontinuities between ordinary uses of philosophically significant expressions ("know", e.g.) and their use in philosophical thought experiments. I discuss some evidence from experimental psychology and behavioral economics indicating that there is a risk of overlooking important aspects of meaning or misinterpreting experimental results by focusing only on abstract experimental scenarios, rather than employing more diverse and more ecologically valid experimental designs. I conclude by presenting a revised version of the critical argument from ordinary language. Thanks to Emma Borg, Wesley Buckwalter, Kathryn Francis, members of the CCR summer seminar at the University of Reading, participants at the CCCOM Workshop on Communication and Understanding at the University of Stockholm, and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments on versions of this paper. Thanks to Robert Baron, Herb Clark, and Kristen Syrett for permission to reprint figures.

show abstract

“…In what follows, I distinguish between Gettier's cases, which I have already discussed, and "Gettier" cases (always with scare quotes). The former come from Gettier's original paper, but the latter are merely a nominal category with no underlying unity (Turri 2016a). For reasons already discussed, no serious study of knowledge judgments would use Gettier's cases because the results could not be meaningfully interpreted.…”

Section: !mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases

Turri¹

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter reviews some faults of the theoretical literature and findings from the experimental literature on “Gettier” cases. Some “Gettier” cases are so poorly constructed that they are unsuitable for serious study. Some longstanding assumptions about how people tend to judge “Gettier” cases are false. Some “Gettier” cases are judged similarly to paradigmatic ignorance, whereas others are judged similarly to paradigmatic knowledge, rendering it a theoretically useless category. Experimental procedures can affect how people judge “Gettier” cases. Some important central tendencies in judging “Gettier” cases appear to be robust against demographic variation in biological sex, age, language, and culture, although there could be some interesting differences related to culture and personality traits. Some remaining questions regarding Gettier’s cases, “Gettier” cases, and “the Gettier problem” concern the psychology and sociology of contemporary anglophone theoretical epistemology. Some remaining questions regarding the empirical study of knowledge judgments concern mechanisms underlying observed behavioral patterns.

show abstract

Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases

Cited by 14 publications

References 54 publications

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

“Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy

Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About