Knowledge for a Common World? On the Place of Feminist Epistemology in Philosophy of Education

Abstract

The paper discusses the place of feminist epistemology in philosophy of education. Against frequently raised criticisms, the paper argues that the issues raised by feminist standpoint theory lead neither to a reduction of questions of knowledge to questions of power or politics nor to the endorsement of relativism. Within the on-going discussion in feminist epistemology, we can find lines of argument which provide the grounds for a far more radical critique of the traditional, narrow notion of objectivity, revealing it as inherently flawed and inconsistent and allowing for the defense of a re-worked, broader, more accurate understanding of objectivity. This is also in the interest of developing a strong basis for a feminist critique of problematically biased and repressive epistemological practices which can further be extended to shed light on the way in which knowledge has become distorted through the repression of other non-dominant epistemic standpoints. Thus, requiring a thorough re-thinking of our conceptions of objectivity and rationality, feminist epistemologies need to be carefully considered in order to improve our understanding of what knowledge for a common world implies in the pluralistic and diverse societies of post-traditional modernity in the 21st century.

Does simulation in medical education enhance or inhibit the development of self-knowledge?

“…The student voice in medical education is not commonly heard in the design of simulation activities or the associated assessment process (Elliot et al, 2019). This research study utilised the standpoint theory which attests that within any social encounter, there are submissive and dominant parties; these roles are interchangeable and are either consciously or unconsciously engaged with (Kokushkin, 2014;Schumann, 2016). Standpoint theory is grounded in feminism and legitimises the opinion and agency of the submissive (whether that is by gender, role or circumstance) and contrasts this with the opinion of those deemed to be in a dominant position (Jovic et al, 2006;Bleakley, 2013).…”

Epistemology and Education

“…Between them, these two papers pose very important questions about the power and limitations of philosophy, and about the appropriate relationship between philosophy and social theory: these are big questions that yield no easy answers. Claudia Schumann [3] contributes to the debate a defence against the argument that feminism undermines epistemology through politicising it. Feminist critique does not merely reduce philosophy to sociology by dealing with issues of power or lapsing into thoroughgoing relativism.…”

‘Epistemological diversity’ in education: Philosophical and didactic considerations

“…In her book Technofeminism Judy Wajcman (2004) makes a similar plea for 'epistemological diversity' and for the coexistence of a multitude of truths. Other popular, related terms include 'democratic epistemology' (Nkomo 2000, p. 54), 'multicultural epistemologies' (Banks 1998), 'African'/'Afrocentric epistemology' (Asante 1990;Bakari 1997;Teffo 2000, p. 112), 'feminist epistemology' (Harding 1987;1996;Code 2012;Schumann 2016), 'Chicana feminist epistemology ' (Delgado Bernal 1998), 'Afrocentric feminist epistemology ' (Hill Collins 1990), etc. -alongside references to 'sexist'/'androcentric' and 'racist epistemologies' (Braidotti 1991;1993;2006;Scheurich, Young 1997, respectively), as well as 'ecology of knowledges' (De Sousa Santos et al 2008), 'women's' or 'gendered ways of knowing' (Belenky et al 1986;Harding 1996), 'Islamization of knowledge' (Dangor 2005), and 'African' or 'native ways of knowing' (Dei 2002;Barnhardt, Kawagley 2005, respectively).…”