1997
DOI: 10.1017/s0269888997003032
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Knowledge engineering in the communication of Information for safety critical systems

Abstract: The design and assessment of safety critical systems often involves broad and distributed teams of designers, suppliers and analysts who represent diverse areas of expertise and motivations. Accurate and effective communication between these groups is therefore an issue of primary importance. The formalisation of specifications and arguments of safety can be of significant benefit in ensuring the consistency of evidence in such cases, when it must be presented across many domains. However, a formal descriptio… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

1998
1998
2001
2001

Publication Types

Select...
1
1
1

Relationship

0
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
references
References 54 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…This is to say, the object language and meta-framework we propose offers a sufficiently expressive form of representing dependability arguments, but a formal description of such an argument may be confusing or unconvincing unless it is presented in a form which is (or forms which are) accessible to the broad range of reviewers who must assess it. This issue, as it relates specifically to dependability arguments for safety-critical systems, is discussed at length in (Gurr 1997). A conclusion of that discussion is that salient and accessible presentations of the high-level structure of dependability arguments, such as those which the diagrammatic ASCE and GSN notations reviewed in Section 2 seek to capture, are an essential part of an effective argument representation.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is to say, the object language and meta-framework we propose offers a sufficiently expressive form of representing dependability arguments, but a formal description of such an argument may be confusing or unconvincing unless it is presented in a form which is (or forms which are) accessible to the broad range of reviewers who must assess it. This issue, as it relates specifically to dependability arguments for safety-critical systems, is discussed at length in (Gurr 1997). A conclusion of that discussion is that salient and accessible presentations of the high-level structure of dependability arguments, such as those which the diagrammatic ASCE and GSN notations reviewed in Section 2 seek to capture, are an essential part of an effective argument representation.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%