Knowledge, Bets, and Interests

Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism

“…Pinillos and Simpson (, p. 12) and Weatherson () observe that SSI is committed to existential claims about the effect of practical stakes on knowledge: sometimes context affects our truth‐value judgments about knowledge ascriptions. Contextualism plausibly involves a similar existential claim: sometimes certain contextual parameters (stakes and mentioned possibilities of error) can affect the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions.…”

A Plea for Falsehoods

“… Weatherson () makes the point that the shape of the decision matrix is determined by your full beliefs, but he thinks that the beliefs need to amount to knowledge in order to play that role. Weatherson, then, is a prime example of a philosopher who adopts what I later call, following Dutant (forthcoming), “knowledge‐based decision theory.” …”

“…Weatherson (ms) argues against E = K and for the identification of evidence with the outputs of reliable Fodorian modules, allowing explicitly for false evidence. Surprisingly, Weatherson () defends knowledge‐based decision theory and considers justified‐true‐belief‐based decision theory, but not a plain rationality‐based (or justification‐based) theory. He thinks that the property of being a justified true belief is less natural than the property of being a known proposition, and then seems to conclude that any property weaker than knowledge will be less natural.…”

The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate

“…Paradigm defenses of pragmatism include Fantl and McGrath (), Hawthorne (), Stanley (), Ganson (), Fantl and McGrath (), Weatherson (), Schroeder (), and Ross and Schroeder (). Paradigm defenses of purism include Neta (), Brown (), Nagel (), DeRose (), Fumerton (), Lackey (), Reed (), Brown (), Reed (), Neta (), Cohen (), and Reed ().…”