Knowledge-based causal attribution: The abnormal conditions focus model.

Hilton, Denis; Slugoski, Ben R.

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.1.75

Cited by 461 publications

(471 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…All previous models Kelley, 1967Kelley, , 1973Orvis et al, 1975), with the exception of those of Forsterling (1989) and Hilton and Slugoski (1986), made predictions that were based on configurations. One interpretation of all configuration-based models is that they predict the same attributions for all of our problems that shared a configuration.…”

Section: Interpretation Of Biases Based On Experiments Specifying Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covariation in natural causal induction.

Cheng

Novick²

1992

Psychological Review

370

321

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The covariation component of everyday causal inference has been depicted, in both cognitive and social psychology as well as in philosophy, as heterogeneous and prone to biases. The models and biases discussed in these domains are analyzed with respect to focal sets: contextually determined sets of events over which covariation is computed. Moreover, these models are compared to our probabilistic contrast model, which specifies causes as first and higher order contrasts computed over events in a focal set. Contrary to the previous depiction of covariation computation, the present assessment indicates that a single normative mechanism-the computation of probabilistic contrasts-underlies this essential component of natural causal induction both in everyday and in scientific situations.We do not perceive the visual world as a two-dimensional mosaic of bits of light patches. Instead, these data from the retina are processed by our central visual system to yield a coherent perception of the world, reflecting its visual and spatial structures. Similarly, we do not perceive our lives or the world beyond as a stream of unconnected elemental events. Here, too, central processes act on the data to yield an organized view, structured in terms of commonsensical and scientific theories. Causal induction is an example of such organizing processes. When a government resorts to violent suppression of its people or yields to peaceful reform, when a couple decides to date or a marriage breaks up, or when an epidemic strikes or a new vaccine controls it, we seek out causes.How do ordinary people induce the causes of events? Moreover, given that the primary goals of causal induction are the recovery of the causal structure of the world and the prediction of future events, is the mechanism underlying natural causal induction adequate for satisfying these goals? Covariation-the change in the probability of an effect given the presence versus the absence of a potential cause-has generally been regarded as a necessary (although insufficient) criterion of normative causal induction. 1 The computation of covariation has generated a considerable body of research in the cognitive and social literatures, both of which have presented rather messy pictures of the psychological mechanism. These literatures suggest that the covariation component in natural causal induction is non-

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Section: Interpretation Of Biases Based On Experiments Specifying Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covariation in natural causal induction.

Cheng

Novick²

1992

Psychological Review

370

321

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…It has been known for decades that actual causation judgments can be influenced by statistical norms (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986). Suppose that a person leaves a lit match on the ground and thereby starts a forest fire.…”

Section: First Effect: Abnormal Inflationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normality and actual causal strength

2017

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Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation.

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“…events in the real world, and from these instances they compute co-occurrence between the events to make causal attributions (Cheng & Novick, 1990;Försterling, Buhner, & Gall, 1998;Hewstone & Jaspers, 1987;Hilton & Slugoski, 1986;Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975;Pruitt & Insko, 1980;Sutton & McClure, 2001).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Cheng & Novick, 1990;Försterling et al, 1998;Hilton & Slugoski, 1986;McArthur, 1972). The underlying assumption seems to be that making causal attributions is the same if you have directly perceived an event and if you are told about such an event.…”

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confidence: 99%

Covariation and quantifier polarity: What determines causal attribution in vignettes?

2006

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Tests of causal attribution often use verbal vignettes, with covariation information provided through statements quantified with natural language expressions. The effect of covariation information has typically been taken to show that set size information affects attribution. However, recent research shows that quantifiers provide information about discourse focus as well as covariation information. In the attribution literature, quantifiers are used to depict covariation, but they confound quantity and focus. In four experiments, we show that focus explains all (Experiment 1) or some (Experiments 2-4) of the impact of covariation information on the attributions made, confirming the importance of the confound. Attribution experiments using vignettes that present covariation information with natural language quantifiers may overestimate the impact of set size information, and ignore the impact of quantifier-induced focus. q 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Keywords: Attribution theory; Causal reasoning; Covariation; Quantifiers Den divorced Angie, Maureen loves Billy, Ian hates Phil-but why? Making causal attributions about social situations is a core part of every day human cognition. A prominent idea about how people make causal attributions is that they use covariation information, the observed co-occurrence of two events (Kelley, 1967). More recently, covariation theory in its many guises assumes that people are exposed to instances of

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Knowledge-based causal attribution: The abnormal conditions focus model.

Cited by 461 publications

References 19 publications

Covariation in natural causal induction.

Covariation in natural causal induction.

Normality and actual causal strength

Covariation and quantifier polarity: What determines causal attribution in vignettes?

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