Knowledge and Imagination in Fiction and Autobiography

Abstract

Autobiographies are particularly interesting in the context of moral philosophy because they offer us rare and extended examples of how other people think, feel and reflect, which is of crucial importance in the development of phronesis (practical wisdom). In this article, Martha Nussbaum's use of fictional literature is shown to be of limited interest, and her arguments in Poetic Justice against the use of personal narratives in moral philosophy are shown to be unfounded. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of mimesis shows that Nussbaum's claims for fictional literature also apply to personal narratives. A case is then made for the importance of personal narratives in developing practical wisdom, and three sub-genres of autobiography are discussed: (1) the confession, (2) the apology and (3) the testimonial. These sub-genres exemplify some of the unique features of personal narratives.There is a sin of omission in the discussions about the ethical or moral significance of literature over the past couple of decades. These discussions have focused on fictional literature exclusively, and personal narratives in the form of biographies and autobiographies have been notably absent. I shall investigate whether these two broad categories of narratives, the fictional and the personal, have different profiles with regard to what each of them can contribute to the broad and ancient conception of ethics as an answer to the question of how to live our lives. My focus will be on what the previously neglected personal narratives can contribute.These narratives, usually in the form of biographies or autobiographies, may have the unique feature of telling us how real people have felt and thought, and what insight they may have gainedFif any. For Aristotle, and my perspective is Aristotelian of a kind, a crucial element in living a good life is the development of practical wisdom, phronesis. Phronesis requires self-insight, as well as an ability to judge and understand the personalities, feelings and circumstances of others. This is not a passive and purely intellectual quality but one that is only valuable if it r

What Fictive Narrative Philosophy Can Tell Us: Stories, Cases, and Thought Experiments

“…Whenever she thinks about euthanasia, her mother's story is always in the backdrop. In a similar way, abstract principles some of the literature that influenced this essay see the following that are at least somewhat sympathetic to my approach: Ross (1969), Gooding-Williams (1986), Skilleas (2006), Leigh Anderson (1992), Blanchot (1992), Mulhall (2002 and2007). For those opposed see: Mueller (1948), Richards (1949)-especially 274, 279, Nelson (1997, and Megill (1985).…”

Teaching Critical Thinking Virtues and Vices

“…This shape is very helpful from a teacher's point of view, but it must be stressed that this does not rule out finding similar value in some non-fictional dialogues, and indeed it can be important that students are exposed to these to pre-empt any concerns that Twelve Angry Men is unrealistic. Just as Nussbaum (1990, 46;1995, 5) concedes that biographies and histories that pay sufficient attention to particularities and emotions can share the ethical relevance of literature (a point more thoroughly developed by Skilleås, 2006), so it should be conceded that this particular educative benefit of fictional dialogues can be matched by well-chosen real-life encounters. A recent example is the (two-person rather than group) discussion between Kathy Newman and Jordan Peterson about the gender pay gap on the UK's Channel 4 News (in January 2018).…”

What Fictive Narrative Philosophy Can Tell Us: Stories, Cases, and Thought Experiments

“…Whenever she thinks about euthanasia, her mother's story is always in the backdrop. In a similar way, abstract principles some of the literature that influenced this essay see the following that are at least somewhat sympathetic to my approach: Ross (1969), Gooding-Williams (1986), Skilleas (2006), Leigh Anderson (1992), Blanchot (1992), Mulhall (2002 and2007). For those opposed see: Mueller (1948), Richards (1949)-especially 274, 279, Nelson (1997), and Megill (1985.…”