Knowing Who: How Perspectives and Context Interact

Aloni, Maria; Jacinto, Bruno

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02943-6_6

Cited by 2 publications

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References 10 publications

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“…MM . See Aloni (2008) for a proposal which relativises questions to conceptual covers (a version of the partition approach), Aloni and Jacinto (2014) for an application of this approach to knowing who, and Stanley (2011, pp. 106-109) for the suggestion that some of the context-sensitivity of knowledge-wh has close relation to Frege puzzles.…”

Section: Questions As Partitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowing more (about questions)

Habgood‐Coote

2022

Synthese

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How should we measure knowledge? According to the Counting Approach, we can measure knowledge by counting pieces of knowledge. Versions of the Counting Approach that try to measure knowledge by counting true beliefs with suitable support or by counting propositions known run into problems, stemming from infinite numbers of propositions and beliefs, difficulties in individuating propositions and beliefs, and cases in which knowing the same number of propositions contributes differently to knowledge. In this paper I develop a novel question-relative and contextualist version of the counting approach, which measures an agent's knowledge by counting the number of complete answers of a contextually salient issue they can rule out. The question-relative and contextualist version of the Counting Approach avoids the issues for the proposition and belief-based systems, and offers a general, systematic, and explanatory system for measuring knowledge.

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Section: Questions As Partitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Not all subject-matters are so complicated: The Party might correspond to a partition in which each cell is a list of possible party-goers, notable events, drinks and food served, and times at which people left.23 For an invariantist account of interrogatives, seeBraun (2006Braun ( , 2011, and for assessment, seeAloni and Jacinto (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Knowing more (about questions)

Habgood‐Coote

2022

Synthese

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The Attitudes We Can Have

Drucker

2020

The Philosophical Review

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This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and admiration. And third, even for non-doxastic attitudes like that, not just any description will allow it. The article argues that one should think of attitude formation like one does (practical) choices among options. The article motivates this view linguistically, extending “relevant alternatives” theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice, and some important differences between doxastic and non-doxastic “choices,” one can explain these puzzling phenomena.

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Knowing Who: How Perspectives and Context Interact

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Knowing more (about questions)

Knowing more (about questions)

The Attitudes We Can Have

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