Knowing Persons

Gerson, Lloyd P.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288670.001.0001

Cited by 11 publications

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“…I take it that 11 uses the phrase ontologically. 60 My view stands in striking contrast to one held by Gerson (2003). Whereas I have suggested that we can avoid gd's sceptical conclusion by distinguishing the content from the object of knowledge, Gerson argues that distinguishing the content from the object of knowledge leads to scepticism.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5

Fine

2020

Int. J. Study Skept.

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One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms. Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that hasn’t been brought to bear in this context, and that indeed he is sometimes thought not to draw: that between the content and object of knowledge. Once we are clear about this distinction, we can see that the sceptical argument doesn’t imply that we can’t know forms.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5

Fine

2020

Int. J. Study Skept.

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“…Or, put in another way, the Conceptualist Reading focuses on conditions that enable beliefs to have representational content (full stop), whereas the Realist Reading focuses on how beliefs can represent the world correctly. It certainly seems more natural to read the argument at stage two as referring to 'reality' (Cooper 1970) or 'objectivity' (Gerson 2003) or simply to 'fact' (Kanayama 1987), or 'So-sein' (Heitsch 1988) -how things really, actually are. According to the Realist Reading, the argument at stage two shows that soul, in 'reasoning and calculating', tries to find out whether abstract properties like sameness and beauty (186A2-B1) or perceptual properties like hardness (186B2-9) really apply to given objects.…”

Section: Introducing the Realist Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Plato on the Rationality of Belief.Theaetetus184-7

Lott¹

2011

Trames

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This paper offers an explanation of why Plato, in his later dialogues, begins to view the capacity of belief formation as necessarily involving the reasoning part of the soul. I will argue that the standard explanation, according to which for later Plato forming beliefs requires cognitive access to intelligibles (Forms), is unsatisfactory. My focus will be on the passage from Plato's Theaetetus (184B-187A), which is crucial for understanding Plato's notion of belief. I will argue that this passage does not support the standard explanation, and develop an alternative reading ofthe passage, according to which forming a belief is a goal-directed activity aiming at truth. In other words, it is the epistemic goal of forming beliefs that matters for Plato, not the cognitive preconditions.

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“…Throughout her speech and even in her final words, Diotima is concerned not with the soul but with the ἄνθρωπος. Gerson () argues that Plato distinguishes between the human being and the person. He rightly notes (p. 2) that ‘ἄνθρωπος’ is usually translated as human or man but that Plato lacked a technical term for person .…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Accordingly, I am not entering into the discussion of whether or not subjective perspectives are required for personhood or whether or not Plato countenanced such perspectives. See Gill () and Gerson (, pp. 1–14).…”

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confidence: 99%

Platonic Personal Immortality

Reed

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I argue that Plato distinguishes between personal immortality and immortality of the soul. I begin by criticizing the consensus view that Plato identifies the person and the soul. I then turn to the issue of immortality. By considering passages from Symposium and Timaeus, I make the case that Plato thinks that while the soul is immortal by nature, if a person is going to be immortal, they must become so. Finally, I argue that Plato has a psychological continuity approach to personal identity. Thus, for Plato, a person becomes immortal by avoiding reincarnation and securing for themselves psychological continuity forever.

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Knowing Persons

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5

Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5

Plato on the Rationality of Belief.Theaetetus184-7

Platonic Personal Immortality

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