Knowing Failably

Hetherington, Stephen

doi:10.2307/2564624

Cited by 93 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…Stephen Hetherington rejects 2 (Hetherington 1999). 7 He contends that a Gettier subject knows despite coming perilously close to not knowing, and supplements this by diagnosing intuitions to the contrary.…”

Section: Near Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Turri

2010

Synthese

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Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly 'no', as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don't obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief.

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Section: Near Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Turri

2010

Synthese

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“…11 For dissent see Hetherington (1998Hetherington ( , 1999, Weatherson (2003), Turri (2012b) and Starmans and Friedman (2012); but see also Turri (2011d) and Turri (2013b). 12 A third, more controversial type of example involves non-Gettiered justified true beliefs, which supposedly nevertheless fall short of knowledge because the subject's justification isn't strong enough to yield knowledge.…”

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confidence: 99%

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

Turri

2013

Philos Stud

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I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.

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“…This and the following case are modifications of an example that appears inGoldman (1976), to whom it was suggested by Carl Ginet.19 Hetherington (1999) is an exception. He regards Gettier cases as borderline instances of knowledge Sosa (2007).…”

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confidence: 72%

A new argument for skepticism

Reed

2008

Philos Stud

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The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference-the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available-one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true-that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

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Knowing Failably

Cited by 93 publications

References 0 publications

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

A new argument for skepticism

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