Kleptocracy and revolutions

Grossman, Herschel I.

doi:10.1093/oep/51.2.267

Cited by 187 publications

(124 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…8,9 Or as Grossman states, "in such insurrections the insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates". 10 In particular, academic literature has centered on the role of natural resources, in overcoming this resource constraint and thereby influencing the nature of the conflict. Collier and Hoeffler were among the first who examined this possible relationship.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Drugs Boosting Conflict? A Micro-Level Test of the Linkage Between Substance Use and Violence

Hecker

Haer

2014

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Many studies have emphasized the role of natural resources in the onset and duration of armed conflict. Due to its characteristics, narcotics are considered to be one of the most influential resources. However, the dynamics of how this particular commodity is linked to conflict is still not well understood. Most scholars have focused on the revenue aspects of narcotics and only few have mentioned the micro-level aspect, i.e. the effect of drugs intake and alcohol consumption on combatant's behavior during the conflict. With the help of a dataset based on 224 interviews held with former combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we examined this latter dynamic. Our analyses show, after controlling for armed group-level and individual-level variables, that drug intake and alcohol consumption boost the amount of perpetrated violent actions by combatants.

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Drugs Boosting Conflict? A Micro-Level Test of the Linkage Between Substance Use and Violence

Hecker

Haer

2014

Terrorism and Political Violence

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“…If a government could absorb resources without the need for the bureaucracy required for taxation and collection of other revenues, the state's dependence on rents could result in diminished accountability to its citizens. The ability to exploit a larger resource pool from the population is an incentive to be a kleptocratic ruler (Grossman 1999), and as food is essentially an in-kind income transfer, it could release other funds to sponsor the military or repression of the population. Azam (1995) presents a game theory model that predicts that aid will cause inefficient spending on defence by both the government and opposition, but in this same vein aid could be used for redistributive purposes to opponents, leading to 'gifting' to prevent conflict.…”

Section: Emergency Food Aidmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future Directions

Margolies

Hoddinott

2012

SSRN Journal

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This paper provides an overview on the impacts of food aid. We consider its effects on consumption, nutrition, food markets and labour supply, as well as the extent to which it exacerbates or mitigates conflict. We also consider the comparative evidence on alternatives to food aid including evidence on cost, impact, relative risks and beneficiary preferences. We note that there are two large gaps in the extant literature: the comparative effects of food and cash assistance at the household level; and the causal links between food aid and conflict.

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“…The 1917 revolutions that empowered the Bolsheviks were expected to radically transform the existing order. Once in power, however, the ambitious intellectuals that had mounted the revolution emulated their predecessor's clientele (Grossman, 1999;Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). The elites throughout this period were therefore selected upon those personal characteristics that granted them with power in the society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

Sekeris

2010

Econ Gov

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In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract rents. Instead of viewing the favors' beneficiaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous entity, we allow the king to decide whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential support -their strength -they could bring to the regime. While the ruler can select the elites on the basis of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in introducing some uncertainty in the cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients' cooptation price since in the event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society's strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the composition of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt subjects. Weak institutions Autocracy Rent seeking Elites

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Kleptocracy and revolutions

Cited by 187 publications

References 16 publications

Drugs Boosting Conflict? A Micro-Level Test of the Linkage Between Substance Use and Violence

Drugs Boosting Conflict? A Micro-Level Test of the Linkage Between Substance Use and Violence

Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future Directions

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

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