Klaus von Lampe: Organized crime: analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance

Lombardo, Robert M.

doi:10.1007/s12117-016-9295-y

Cited by 22 publications

(42 citation statements)

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“…While this could be the case in some networks, organized crime networks are better approached by understanding the nature of the groups, that is, the diversity of their cooperation within a system and context, the level of influence and links among members [Felson et al, 2006, Carrington, 2011, Luna-Pla and Nicolás-Carlock, 2020. When groups are informal, the beneficial ownership is hidden, information is scarce, and the end purposes are unclear, network approaches helps to depict the complexity of the problem by offering a global view of the activities perpetuating the illicit business over time [Morselli, 2013, Ribeiro et al, 2018, Martins et al, 2022, as well as intervention and control strategies according to specific environments [Von Lampe, 2015, da Cunha and Gonçalves, 2018, Solimine, 2021.…”

Section: Final Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organized crime behavior of shell-company networks in procurement: prevention insights for policy and reform

Nicolás-Carlock¹,

Luna-Pla²

2023

Trends Organ Crim

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In recent years, the analysis of economic crime and corruption in procurement has benefited from integrative studies that acknowledge the interconnected nature of the procurement ecosystem. Following this line of research, we present a networks approach for the analysis of shell-companies operations in procurement that makes use of contracting and ownership data under one framework to gain knowledge about the organized crime behavior that emerges in this setting. In this approach, ownership and management data are used to identify connected components in shell-company networks that, together with the contracting data, allows to develop an alternative representation of the traditional buyer-supplier network: the module-component bipartite network, where the modules are groups of buyers and the connected components are groups of suppliers. This is applied to two documented cases of procurement corruption in Mexico characterized by the involvement of large groups of shell-companies in the misappropriation of millions of dollars across many sectors. We quantify the economic impact of single versus connected shell-companies operations. In addition, we incorporate metrics for the diversity of operations and favoritism levels. This paper builds into the quantitative organized crime in the private sector studies and contributes by proposing a networks approach for preventing fraud and understanding the need for legal reforms.

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Section: Final Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organized crime behavior of shell-company networks in procurement: prevention insights for policy and reform

Nicolás-Carlock¹,

Luna-Pla²

2023

Trends Organ Crim

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“…Las divergencias entre Agadez y el golfo del Urabá se agrandan debido a que se considera una única categoría para dos asuntos que implican dinámicas y resultados distintos. El uso de definiciones inexactas oscurece los propósitos de la discusión y puede llevar a políticas enfocadas en la militarización gracias a una lectura poco rigurosa del fenómeno (Von Lampe, 2015).…”

Section: Conclusiones: Crimen Organizado Violencia Y Militarizaciónunclassified

Violencia contra migrantes: comprensión del crimen organizado más allá de la violencia

Sarmiento¹,

Bravo-Hernández²,

RAMOS³

2023

REF

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Este artículo busca explicar por qué hay más violencia contra migrantes y transportistas en algunas regiones que en otras. Para esto, se compararon el ecosistema criminal (número y tipo de actores criminales en un territorio) y la resiliencia estatal (capacidad de un Estado para tomar medidas de combate contra el crimen organizado) en el Golfo del Urabá (Colombia) y Agadez (Níger), y se ofrece evidencia de otras cinco subregiones entre 2015 y 2022 utilizando datos del índice del crimen organizado del Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Se encontró que la violencia es un recurso del que tienen más incentivos los grupos jerárquicamente organizados para utilizar contra migrantes y transportistas que aquellos grupos criminales más pequeños o pobremente organizados. La hipótesis apunta únicamente a la violencia contra migrantes y transportistas. Más trabajo debe ser hecho para abordar otras formas de violencia del crimen organizado.

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“…The well‐documented Lavin enterprise in the USA is an example of a criminal organization which did not threaten its members with violence, but rather rewarded them for their loyalty (see, e.g., von Lampe, 2016, pp. 130–135).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

Bravard,

Durieu,

Kamphorst

et al. 2023

J Public Economic Theory

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Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.

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Klaus von Lampe: Organized crime: analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

Organized crime behavior of shell-company networks in procurement: prevention insights for policy and reform

Organized crime behavior of shell-company networks in procurement: prevention insights for policy and reform

Violencia contra migrantes: comprensión del crimen organizado más allá de la violencia

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

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