Kitcher and the Obsessive Unifier*

Roland, Jeffrey W.

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00200.x

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Yet, as Jones (1995) observes, these objections are indecisive until Kitcher's account is fleshed out to allow us to tell more precisely which function of factors a-c is unity. Similar problems plague Roland's (2008) and Humphrey's (1993) objections to Kitcher's account. There is always the possibility that Kitcher's account can be fleshed out to avoid these objections.…”

Section: Unity As An Epistemic Virtue 993mentioning

confidence: 88%

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Unity As An Epistemic Virtue

Patrick

2017

Erkenn

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It's widely supposed that unification is an epistemic virtue: the degree to which a theory is unified contributes to its overall confirmation. However, this supposition has consequences which haven't been noted, and which undermine the leading accounts of unification. For, given Hempel's equivalence condition, any epistemic virtue must be such that logically equivalent theories must equally well unify any body of evidence, and logically equivalent bodies of evidence must be equally well unified by any theory. Yet the leading accounts of unification in Bayesian terms, or those in terms of argument patterns, cannot satisfy these constraints conditions. The reason for this runs deep: these accounts of unification make unity depend on factors that vary between equivalent theories: the probabilistic relations of their components, or their relations to argument patterns. The solution is to abandon such accounts and instead adopt an account of unity based on worldly relations such as causation, rather than inferential relations. Such an account effortlessly satisfies the equivalence conditions, and so may describe the epistemic virtue of unity.Suppose that unification is an epistemic virtue: the degree to which a theory unifies the evidence contributes to its overall confirmation. This has consequences for what account of unity we can accept. For unity can be an epistemic virtue only if it satisfies the 'equivalence conditions', i.e. only if logically equivalent theories equally well unify any given body of evidence, and only if logically equivalent bodies of evidence are equally well unified by any theory. Accounts of unity have been developed by Friedman

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Section: Unity As An Epistemic Virtue 993mentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Roland (2008) introduces causation to solve the 'obsessive unifier' problem with Kitcher's account of unity. Roughly, Roland's idea is that the best way to exclude irrelevant information from argument patterns is to exclude causally irrelevant factors.…”

Section: How To Easily Satisfy the Equivalence Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unity As An Epistemic Virtue

Patrick

2017

Erkenn

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Scientific explanation and understanding: unificationism reconsidered

Bangu

2016

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

Roland

2009

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief‐regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.

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Kitcher and the Obsessive Unifier*

Cited by 3 publications

References 11 publications

Unity As An Epistemic Virtue

Unity As An Epistemic Virtue

Scientific explanation and understanding: unificationism reconsidered

A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

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